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Abstract  
This thesis evaluates the economic and Marxist claims on excess. As its official science, 
economics takes the capitalist economy as a given and explains excess as savings on costs 
resulting from the strategic planning of capitalist agents, whose point of view, in studying 
economic phenomena, economics takes. Marx, in a historicist move, argues that capitalism is but 
one political economy among many, where the facts assumed by economics, such as savings, are, 
far from given, attributable to a particular systemic formation (a political event) of social 
relations and materials into an economy. This systemic social formation that comes to be called 
capitalism, Marx argues, involves at its core the exploitation of labor, in which capitalists 
expropriate the surplus value that laborers produce, appropriate it as their profits, which is then 
accumulated as additional capital. 
While this thesis takes the view that something similar to what Marx refers to as 
exploitation takes place in the capitalist social formation, I argue that a further standpoint beyond 
historicism is called for to account for the contribution, in addition to that of labor (whose point 
of view Marx takes), of other elements to the system. Deleuze’s metaphysics provides this 
standpoint by describing the abstract process that underlies all political economies, namely the 
assemblage of different elements into a unified, consistent, and productive whole that is the 
social formation. Thereby exploitation is revealed as a concrete actualization of the virtual 
process that Deleuze calls capture, an actualization specific to capitalism.  
More importantly, capitalist capture is revealed to presuppose a spontaneous generation 
of excess. As such, exploitation does not exhaust all the productive capacities of the system and 
is but one potential source of values among others. As Deleuze is quick to point out, however, all 
the (economic) potentials presupposed to be spontaneously generated are inseparable from the 
(political) process of capture that subordinates values to the dominant element in the system (e.g. 
to capital). Marx thus has some warrant to assert that exploitation is fundamental not only to the 
workings of the capitalist system but, more importantly, to the production of excess. 
 
 1 
Introduction: Marx, Deleuze, and Political Economy 
In his critique of political economy from the Grundrisse to Capital, Karl Marx 
presupposes abstraction and quantification. The process by which activity and its product are 
alienated from the human worker, which as independent existences are then measured and valued 
numerically, is in fact a pervasive phenomenon in the capitalist political economy. Equally 
widespread is excess, which economics, the political economy’s official science, records as 
profit. Marx thinks the phenomenon differently as surplus value resulting from the processes of 
alienation and valorization. Surplus value, in turn, is connected by Marx to the further but no less 
marked phenomenon of recurrent crises, recognized by economics as a structural feature of the 
capitalist system. 
There is, in a sense, a consensus between Marx’s thought and mainstream economics, 
originating as this latter does from the political economy of Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, and 
David Ricardo, which is precisely the target of Marx’s critique. In both strands of thinking about 
the economy, there is the recognition, taken almost for granted, that there is excess: there is more 
in the end than was there in the beginning. It is assumed, in other words, that the product has 
more value than what was put in its production. The disagreement lies rather on how this excess 
originates (where it comes from). This is a question worth raising not only because it clarifies the 
nature of the excess and its production (which then may have significant consequences over its 
distribution), but, more importantly, because this excess itself is that upon which the social 
formation is founded and rests (and as such sheds light on its rules and relations). 
This thesis sets against each other the economic and Marxist claims on excess. As its 
official science, economics takes the capitalist economy as a given (as the ‘natural’ state of the 
economy, as it were) and explains excess as savings on costs resulting from the strategic 
planning of capitalist agents, whose point of view, in studying economic phenomena, modern 
economics takes. Marx, in a historicist move, argues that capitalism is but one political economy 
among many, where the facts assumed by the likes of Ricardo, such as the savings supposedly 
reaped by capitalist planning, are, far from given, attributable to a particular systemic formation 
(a political event) of social relations and materials into an economy. This systemic social 
formation that comes to be called capitalism, Marx argues, involves at its core the exploitation of 
labor, in which capitalists expropriate the surplus value that laborers produce, appropriate it as 
their profits, which is then accumulated as additional capital. 
Initially these ideological claims seem irreconcilable and mutually exclusive. While this 
thesis takes the view that something similar to what Marx refers to as exploitation in fact takes 
place in the capitalist social formation, a fundamental mechanism covered over by the 
naturalizing mystifications of political economy and revealed only through a historicist stance 
like that of Marx, I argue that the roles implied by that power mechanism are not mutually 
exclusive and, as such, the acts of ‘exploitation’ are not rigidly designatable to either only capital 
or labor, as Marx claims. I argue that a further standpoint beyond historicism is called for to 
account for the contribution, in addition to that of labor (whose point of view, directly opposed to 
economics’, Marx takes), of capital to the system, not to mention those by other elements, 
including non-human ones. 
The philosophy of Gilles Deleuze (sometimes with Félix Guattari), combined with 
insights from complexity and organization theory, provides this necessary standpoint. Refusing 
to take the capitalist ‘socius’ as natural, taking it, like Marx, as historical, Deleuze nonetheless 
provides some metaphysical grounding through the abstract process that he describes underlies 
all political economies, namely the assemblage of different elements into a unified, consistent, 
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and productive whole that is the social formation. Thereby exploitation is revealed as a concrete 
actualization of the virtual process that Deleuze calls capture, an actualization specific to the 
historical socius that is capitalism.  
More importantly, exploitation or capitalist capture is revealed to presuppose a 
spontaneous generation of excess. As such, exploitation does not exhaust all the productive 
capacities of the system and is but one potential source of further values among others. As 
Deleuze is quick to point out, however, all the (economic) potentials presupposed to be 
spontaneously generated are inseparable from the (political) process of capture that subordinates 
values to the dominant element in the system (e.g. to capital). Marx thus has some warrant to 
assert that exploitation is fundamental not only to the workings of the capitalist system but, more 
importantly, to the production of excess. 
My inquiry into the nature of excess in capitalism is thus both historical and 
metaphysical. A historical standpoint towards the social formation is assumed to avoid taking the 
structural arrangements that lead to certain economic phenomena (such as savings), often reified 
by economics, as natural. At the same time, certain abstract processes, such as the formation of 
the assemblage (that generates excess), are recognized for their virtual reality in all social 
formations, although they appear in historically different forms (e.g. as surplus value or profit in 
capitalism) in which the potentials actualized are different.  
The approach I take, then, reverses that of traditional political economy (which has 
evolved into modern economics). Rather than taking the capitalist political economy and its 
historical phenomena as natural, what I recognize is the metaphysical (and thus universal and 
‘eternal’) status of the virtual assemblage that generates excess. Taking the assemblage as the 
abstract structure or framework (‘abstract machine’ or ‘Idea’ in Deleuze’s terms) that underlies 
all concrete and historically specific political economies, I draw from Deleuze’s philosophy to 
show that capitalism is an assemblage that generates excess. The metaphysical conclusions 
derived from this insight, the processes that will be shown are the true givens of any study of the 
political economy, will then inform the second look at phenomena at work in the capitalist 
political economy, especially the savings and profit (and sometimes loss) that economics takes as 
given, even ‘natural’ (or as resulting from the system that economics takes is the ‘natural’ 
configuration of the economy). 
In order to make the move back from metaphysical abstraction to historical specificity, 
concepts other than those provided by Deleuze in discussing the abstract assemblage are needed 
to connect its metaphysical mechanisms to their historical actualizations. Those provided by 
modern economics are of limited value because, even though specific to the capitalist social 
formation, they tend towards reification of the system. Marx, on the other hand, provides a 
general notion of value that does not necessarily contradict the concepts of economics.  
In Marx’s thought, values result from the alienation/abstraction and 
quantification/valorization that, as established above, is a pervasive phenomenon in capitalism 
(itself admitted by economics). These processes manifest the way in which different human 
actors (more generally, different individual elements) are related in the workings of a political 
economy. As such, values (the expressions of the processes) are the valorized manifestations of 
relations in capitalism, which, Marx shows, are really but the relations of classes (themselves 
manifestations of the two forces mentioned above, labor and capital). The concept of value thus 
provides the necessary connect between the metaphysical, abstract assemblage (philosophized by 
Deleuze) and the historical and concrete social formation (critiqued by Marx). 
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I begin the thesis in the first chapter with a consideration of values and classes. Drawing 
from David Harvey’s reading of Marx’s ‘economics’ (supplemented in certain instances by 
Antonio Negri),1 I argue that values and classes are mirror images of each other (what is abstract 
in one is concrete in the other) that describe the workings of the social formation in general and 
of capitalism in particular. This sets up the more specific inquiry of the succeeding chapters that 
discuss the opposed claims on capitalistic excess, with an eye towards evaluating which claims 
are more valid and which parts can be reconciled.  
In chapter 2, I provide the account of excess given by economics (specifically 
geographical economics). Economics refers to capitalistic excess as profit, which it explains as 
savings on costs. I argue that this is an ideological claim due in large part to the fact that, as 
Marx points out, economics takes the discursive position of capitalism’s official science (and is 
thereby its legitimation). In chapter 3, (again with the help of Harvey and Negri) I lay out Marx’s 
account of surplus value as the result of the exploitation of labor. I argue that Marx’s account is 
ideological as well (taking the point of view, this time, of labor), although, because of its 
historicist stance, is not quite politically complicit (this time, with the class of laborers) in the 
same way as economics. Because Deleuze provides the metaphysics for some parts of both 
claims, he is interwoven in the first two accounts to point out the elaborations he makes on them.  
It is not until chapter 4, however, that a metaphysical account of the whole is constructed 
using Deleuzian philosophy, in which Marx’s historicist account is generalized to reconsider 
some of economics’ claims and, more importantly, to take into account other components in the 
assemblage not considered by both. I show how Marx’s account of exploitation historical to 
capitalism fits in Deleuze’s model of capture in the assemblage (which thereby testifies to the 
former’s presence) and, more importantly, I ‘enlarge upon’ Marx’s concept of primitive 
accumulation by drawing from Deleuze’s discussion of the stock, which gives insight as to how 
excess is ‘spontaneously generated’ in social assemblages. I conclude by raising the question of 
how the accounts given by Deleuze and Marx can be reconciled. More precisely, I ask how 
primitive accumulation and accumulation in general, or stockpiling and exploitative capture, are 
connected. The end is thus not so much an end as a signpost for further research. 
                                                
1 I also insert Moishe Postone’s sometimes differing interpretations in footnotes. While I agree with some of 
Postone’s assertions (which are mostly consistent with Harvey’s), in some places I find them wanting. As such, I 
don’t make use of the framework that he develops and discuss it instead in footnotes. 
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Chapter 1: Values and Classes 
Core to the inquiry of surplus value or profit (the form that excess takes in capitalism) is 
the constitution of value itself. What is value, and under what different forms does it function 
such that, upon reaching a certain point, a surplus is produced? Constitution refers, of course, to 
both the ontological reality and the philosophical conception. The ontological reality is what is at 
work in the political economy that leads to surplus, while the philosophical conception is the 
result of attempts to capture that reality in theoretical terms, delineate it and track it down so as 
to make sense of what it is, how it works, and how it shapes and affects the political economy.2  
The ontological reality has assumed a certain form in the historical formation of the 
political economy that we refer to as capitalism. In that re-constitution (in the first sense), value 
has acquired a uniquely capitalistic character and delivers capitalistic results, with Marx as one 
of the few thinkers to attempt to constitute it (in the second sense), in its capitalistic incarnation, 
as a philosophical conception.3 Marx’s project is distinguished by the fact that, unlike the study 
of political economy in his day, he probes value not from the point of view of (the smooth 
functioning of) the system but from outside, allowing him to call attention to those exploited in 
it. In the process, Marx allows for the possibility of changing the way that value is constituted by 
revolutionizing the social formation in which it works. 
Marx articulates his mature conception of value in the first volume of Capital, a difficult 
and complex conception that could only delineate value as a dialectics between its different 
forms. Harvey, in The Limits to Capital, presents an accessible elucidation without reducing the 
concept’s complexity.4 The three primary forms that value takes in capitalism, Harvey clarifies, 
are (labor) value, use value, and exchange value. Briefly, use value is the satisfaction derived 
from some material (e.g. from a good); exchange value the amount (using a standard numéraire, 
i.e. money) whereby different materials (i.e. commodities) change hands (through transactions in 
an indirect economy5); and labor value is the labor power expended/required to produce the 
material (the product), the cost of production, as it were.6  
To illustrate concretely, Harvey takes money as an example of a material that, by virtue 
of it assuming the form of a commodity (like all other materials in the capitalist economy), 
acquires the different forms of value mentioned.7 “The use value of money is that it facilitates 
the circulation of all other commodities”; its exchange value “the reflex, thrown upon a single 
commodity, of the value relations between all the rest,” i.e. the “worth [of] what it will buy”; and 
                                                
2 The terms used should not mislead. As Deleuze would say, both the ontological and the philosophical—the (actual) 
‘reality’ and the (virtual) conception—are real. 
3 David Ricardo precedes Marx in this attempt, but, unlike Marx, Ricardo never did take class into account, which, 
as the nexus between the forms of value, prices, and relations, is to Marx the pertinent axis. David Harvey, The 
Limits to Capital (London: Verso, 2006), 24. 
4 Harvey extends Marx’s project as well, especially in areas Marx wasn’t able to explore systematically and in 
depth. 
5 As is the case in the capitalist social formation, an indirect economy is one in which, because the individual does 
not directly produce for his own needs/wants, exchange mediates between production and consumption. Thence 
arise problems of measurement and distribution and the ‘commodity’ form. 
6 Not exactly the ‘cost of production’ since the cost of production includes raw materials over and above labor, 
strictly speaking (the amount of human energy expended). Together, however, all the inputs or factors of production 
(labor and non-labor) are counted as necessary for the maintenance of labor (i.e. as ‘necessary labor’), for 
production to keep going; hence their conflation. For more on this, see chapters 3 and 4. 
7 To Marx, “the riddle presented by money is but the riddle presented by commodities . . . in its most glaring form.” 
Cited from Capital in Harvey, 11. 
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its labor value “the socially necessary labour time taken up in its production.”8 Capital, reaped at 
the end of the production process (which is then reinvested at another beginning), is another such 
example. As exchange value, it takes the physical form of money; as use value, it takes the 
physical form of commodities; whereas its labor value is the power that brought it about.9 
Similarly, labor has three forms of value: its labor value is the power spent to produce or do 
something (i.e. labor power); its exchange value what is paid it for the use of its power (i.e. 
wage); and its use value what was produced (i.e. labor’s product, or labor as product). 
Following Marx, Harvey points out that none of these forms (of value) have value in 
themselves (intrinsically).10 Rather, they gain value by virtue of their dialectical relations with 
each other. The three forms of value are related to each other by the particular (capitalistic11) 
way in which the economy works: the product is exchanged as a commodity considered as a 
good by the purchaser. It is not only that the material changes ‘identity’ (i.e. from a product, it 
becomes a commodity . . .). With the change of identity comes a shift in the form of value that 
the same material embodies. The product of a department of a company, for example, is 
considered in the production line by another laborer (from another department) as a raw material 
for his own production. Thus the product becomes a good for someone else in the production 
line, who, when he12 acquires the product as a commodity, transforms that good into a further 
product. In the process, the same material manifested not only labor value (the value of the initial 
labor put into making it) but also exchange value (what was recorded in inter-departmental 
accounting) and use value (the initial labor value and the potential that it has for enabling further 
labor value to be added to it).  
The three forms of value are thus interdependent on each other. In determining their 
value, they have to take account of each other, and value is gained (in its three forms) only by 
virtue of the said interdependent relations. The relations are not merely structural, however.13 
Since the material exhibiting value is the same (or, more precisely, it contains the same material 
kernel, to which value is added; or it is identified as a material undergoing different processes), 
each form, in gaining value, implies in itself the previous forms. Thus the use value of a good is 
affected by how much was exchanged for it and is only made possible by the labor value that 
was put into it.  
This does not mean that all three forms of value are the same. Labor value, for example, 
even as it constitutes part of use value, does not exhaust the latter, since further values have been 
either added to or subtracted from that initial labor value in its transformation as use value. It 
does mean, however, that further forms are ‘syntheses’ of previous forms of value that 
                                                
8 Harvey, 11. In fact, money, Harvey argues, by becoming a commodity, acquires a double exchange value (i.e. the 
worth of what it will buy, its “reflex” value, and its labor value, which is the “inherent” value that, because of the 
unique status of the money commodity, as a yardstick measures how much other commodities are), a discrepancy 
that leads to the extraction of surplus value. I discuss this more in chapter 3. 
9 Harvey, 20. I defer clarification of what “power” brought capital about to chapter 3. 
10 Harvey, 2. 
11 I put ‘capitalistic’ in parentheses because value is both historically specific and abstract. It can be argued, I think, 
that other forms of value are in existence in other (non-capitalistic) political economies.  
12 For simplicity’s sake, all throughout the thesis, the standard indefinite he has been chosen when the pronoun does 
not refer to anyone in particular. It stands in for an abstract schematic functional subject, in no way essentially or 
primarily male. 
13 Structuralism’s basic premise is that a thing, rather than possessing identity in itself, gains determination or 
becomes subjectivated only by virtue of its position in a network with other elements. For more on structuralism, see 
Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, trans. Roy Harris (Chicago: Open Court, 1998). 
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contributed in constituting them. Thus not only does one form delimit its ‘identity’ by virtue of 
another form; resultant forms are syntheses of previous forms. The relations, in other words, are 
dialectical. These relations are by no means linear since what is a good can, in turn, be a raw 
material for another product or an unexpected commodity that is exchanged for something else. 
They are also not synchronic since a value gained has the potential to change in further 
transactions (e.g. once the ‘final’ product enters the market) that imply further dialectical 
relations.14  
These forms of value, like value itself, are to be distinguished from price, with which 
they are associated but distinct. Harvey explains that “values [. . .] express an equilibrium point 
in an exchange ratios after supply and demand have been equilibrated in the market.”15 As such, 
values maintain constancy, attain some rigidity, and cannot fluctuate freely. This necessitates a 
system that can reflect and accommodate “the ebb and flow of commodity production for 
exchange,” a function suitably served by prices, which are not only more flexible than values but 
in fact “permit[] th[e] equilibration process to take place.”16 Prices are thus essential to the 
definition of values. The two categories remain distinct, however, as revealed by times when 
“price ceases altogether to express value.”17 
The dialectical relations that the forms of value sustain with each other entail a particular 
configuration of the economy, namely, the organization of its different activities (its distinct 
elements) into an organic (itself dialectical) unity (perhaps these different activities can be 
expressed, analogous to values, as different forms that human activity takes). After all, value 
morphs into its different forms by virtue of a material going through the different processes of 
the economy—namely production (in which case a material’s labor value is determined), 
distribution and exchange (in which exchange value emerges), and consumption (in which case a 
material becomes a use value)—that connect and are interrelated with each other.  
Like the forms of value, then, the different economic activities themselves, Harvey 
(following Marx) reiterates, “all form members of a totality, differences within a unity [. . . 
whose] ‘reciprocal effects’ [. . . are determined] in the context of capitalist society considered as 
an ‘organic whole.’”18 This is not unexpected since it is this organic whole that, in the form of an 
abstract measure (due to alienation/abstraction and quantification/valorization), the forms of 
value express. In other words, the dialectical relations of the forms of value derive from the 
forms that human activity takes in the (capitalist) political economy, including the reciprocal 
effects that they entertain and the relations (between individual elements performing the said 
human activities) that they imply. For this reason, “value,” Harvey asserts, “must be understood 
                                                
14 For more on dialectics, see the philosophy of G.W.F. Hegel. Needless to say, the version employed here is a loose 
interpretation of the Hegelian original. In particular, ‘synthesis’ as I use it does not totally encapsulate and represent 
the ‘thesis’ and the ‘antithesis.’ For one, there are not only two elements (e.g. labor value and exchange value) that 
lead to the third (e.g. use value), as is made clearer in the following paragraphs, to say nothing of the fact that for 
Hegel, thesis and antithesis are supposed to be large-scale, extreme oppositions. For another, use value (the 
‘synthesis’), as explained above, does not exhaust previous forms (e.g. all of the labor power put into it) and 
contains bits of irreducible difference from a complex process (of production, exchange, further production . . .) 
unaccounted for by a strictly Hegelian framework. Thus while the Hegelian dialectic is a good starting framework 
for analysis, modifications to the model, such as the ones I’ve made, are called for.  
15 Harvey, 18. 
16 Harvey, 18. 
17 Harvey, 18. In this regard, Harvey mentions commodities that are not products of human labor.  
18 Harvey, 41. 
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in terms of the underlying unity of production and consumption, though broken by the separation 
[i.e. by distribution and exchange] between them.”19 
Thus, as with the forms of value, the separate forms that activity takes and the dialectical 
unity in which they consist are commonplace in the capitalist economy. The distinction between 
the activities consists in the specific ‘identity’ that each has taken in the economic process in 
which, as Marx describes it, “production creates the objects which correspond to the given needs; 
distribution divides them up according to social laws; exchange further parcels out already 
divided shares in accord with individual needs; and finally, in consumption, the product steps 
outside this social movement and becomes a direct object and servant of individual need, and 
satisfies it in being consumed.”20  
The unity, on the other hand, consists in the dialectical relations that give these activities 
‘identity’ in the first place and in which these ‘identities’ mesh with and deconstruct each other. 
Production, for example, as seems obvious, “determines the forms of distribution” as what is 
produced is targeted towards the fulfillment of certain needs, thereby the activity of production 
itself determines (or at least affects) how products are to be distributed.21 Distribution, however, 
is not only necessitated by but is necessary to production, for without distribution, production 
would come to a halt.  
Production, moreover, Harvey points out, is itself distributed. In contrast to how it 
appears, it is not only values or products that are distributed. The means of production 
themselves (what is used for production) are divided up among individual participants in the 
economy. This is apparent not only in the distribution of different raw materials or tasks in the 
production process (as in different departments of a company or different industries in an 
economy), but in the division between labor and capital itself (the fundamental distribution in the 
economy, a political act).22 As Harvey puts it, “an initial ‘production-determining’ distribution of 
means of production divides capital from labour, [in which] thereafter distribution relations [are] 
regarded as ‘merely the expression of the specific historical production relations.’”23 Production 
and distribution thus mutually determine each other, enabling both to gain their respective 
‘identities.’  
                                                
19 Harvey, 81. 
20 Marx, Grundrisse, cited in Harvey, 80. 
21 Harvey, 42. 
22 Harvey, 42. This distribution includes the determination, through birth, of the place that individuals occupy in the 
social hierarchy among classes. 
23 Harvey, 55. Similarly, Postone, in Time, Labor, and Social Domination, explains that “Marx’s notion of the mode 
of distribution [. . .] does not refer only to the way in which goods and labor are socially distributed [. . .]; he goes on 
to describe ‘the workers’ propertylessness, and the . . . appropriation of alien labour by capital,’ that is, capitalist 
property relations, as ‘modes of distribution [that] are the relations of production themselves, but sub specie 
distributionis.” Moishe Postone, Time, Labor, and Social Domination: A Reinterpretation of Marx’s Critical Theory 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 22. This is the context in which Marx writes that the “division of 
labour and private property are [. . . really] identical expressions: in the one the same thing is affirmed with 
reference to activity as is affirmed in the other with reference to the product of the activity.” Karl Marx, The German 
Ideology in Karl Marx: Selected Writings, 2nd ed., ed. David McLellan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 
185. For more on the distribution of the means of production as (capitalist) property (in contrast to labor), see the 
discussion of primitive accumulation in chapter 4. 
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Exchange, which is but distribution on a smaller (i.e. individual) scale, in turn links 
distribution (and thereby production) to consumption, and vice versa.24 Production and 
consumption, the activities that seemingly occur at both ends of the process, themselves have a 
dialectical relation (thereby deconstructing the seemingly linear nature of the relations between 
the activities). “Consumption and production,” Harvey explains, “can constitute an immediate 
identity, [. . . either as “productive consumption” when] the act of production entails the 
consumption of raw materials, instruments of labour and labour power” (as when a department in 
a company further processes the products of another) or as “consumptive production” (e.g. the 
preparation, i.e. ‘production,’ of food at home, for immediate consumption).25  
More apparently, production and consumption also entertain relations in which they 
mediate each other. For one, “production creates the material for consumption, dictates [. . . the] 
mode of consumption, at the same time as it provides the motive for consumption through the 
creation [i.e. production] of new social wants.”26 For another, “consumption [. . .] provides the 
motive for production through the representation of idealized human desires as specific human 
wants and needs,” without which production “is rendered entirely redundant.”27  
Most importantly, production and consumption, as “each of them creates the other in 
completing itself, and creates itself as the other,” constitute “reproduction,” in which, in 
consummating the economic activity (as production, through distribution and exchange, reaches 
its destination, consumption), the existing social configuration by which production (more 
precisely, human activity in general) takes place (including the social relations therein)—i.e. the 
economic system itself (and the politics inherent in it; i.e. the political economy)—is 
reproduced.28 Production, distribution, exchange, and consumption thus not only form an organic 
unity of distinct elements; the organic unity that they compose—the particular way in which 
human activity is organized (in this context, the capitalist social formation)—as they function (as 
an organic unity), (like an organism) reproduces itself.29 
                                                
24 For this reason, the class struggle (not only for consumption but for all the four human activities) does not only 
take place in the marketplace (where exchange and distribution are determined), but in the production process itself. 
Harvey, 53. 
25 Harvey, 80. 
26 Harvey, 80. For more on how production stimulates consumption, see the pointed cultural critiques of the 
Frankfurt School, esp. Theodor Adorno, The Culture Industry, ed. J.M. Bernstein (Abingdon: Routledge, 1991), and 
Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, The Dialectic of Enlightenment, ed. Ganzelin Schmid Noerr, trans. Edmund 
Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002). 
27 Harvey, 80. 
28 Harvey, 81. 
29 Postone formulates the dialectical unity of the different economic activities as the dialectical unity between the 
(historical) relations of production and the (historical) relations of distribution (contained in social relations in 
general), distinct from but related to the (transhistorical) productive forces. Distinguishing his position from what he 
calls ‘traditional Marxism’ that asserted (what it construed as) emancipatory relations of production over 
exploitative social relations (that imply certain relations of distribution), Postone writes that “production in 
capitalism is not a purely technical process; it is inextricably related to, and molded by, the basic social relations of 
that society.” Postone, 16. Quoting Marx as arguing that “the ‘laws and conditions’ of the production of wealth and 
the laws of the ‘distribution of wealth’ are the same laws under different forms, and both change, undergo the same 
historic process; are as such only moments of a historic process,” Postone argues, against ‘traditional Marxism,’ that 
it is not only the mode of distribution that has to be revolutionized, but the mode of production as well. Marx, 
Grundrisse, 832, cited in Postone, 22; Postone, 22. Thus the conflict between relations and forces that Marx talks 
about, Postone asserts, really refers to the contradiction not only between the forces of production and the relations 
of distribution but involve the relations (or mode) of production as well. Postone, 22. In other words, Marx, 
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The dialectical unity of the economic activities and of the forms of value are, in fact, but 
manifestations of their social character. After all, production (or human activity in general) in the 
capitalist political economy is undertaken not by individuals alone (not even for one’s own 
consumption) but by a group of individuals socially related to each other in existing material 
conditions. The existence of the market (i.e. the site of exchange and, to a lesser extent, of 
distribution) is perhaps the most glaring manifestation of this, but from the beginning—from 
production where materials and tasks are distributed among different individuals, from 
consumption in which individuals derive fulfillment of their needs from other individuals—
human activity in capitalism is very social. Hence capitalism is, in a very real sense, a social 
formation. That is to say, the capitalist political economy is made up of all sorts of social 
relations between different individuals: between laborers (from different parts of the production 
process), between the laborer and the employer, between the producer and the consumer, etc. 
More than the forms of value and the different activities simply being dialectically related 
to each other by virtue of relations that are social,30 however, value itself gains determination 
only within its social context. Labor value, for example, is not determined by the amount of time 
spent by the laborer in producing something. If such were the case, as Harvey points out, “the 
lazier the labourer, the more [the employer] should pay.”31 Rather, labor value is determined by 
the socially necessary labor time for producing something, i.e. the ‘normal’ amount of time that 
it takes an ‘average’ laborer to produce a certain good. What matters in the determination of 
labor value is thus, in Marx’s words, “the labour required to produce an article under the normal 
conditions of production and with the average degree of skill and intensity prevalent at the 
time.”32 
In other words, it is not that the laborer is paid for how much it takes him (individually) 
to produce something. It is that time is measured based on social averages of productivity, which 
is then used to calculate how much each unit of time is valued, which is the measure used in 
calculating the labor value that each laborer produces. Each laborer, then, is differentiated 
according to the amount of time that he spent at the workplace (and not by the amount of time 
that he produces). By rendering “an infinite variety of concrete labor activities” into “human 
labour in the abstract”33 (thereby making it “commensurable”34 with the help of the money 
form35), labor value thus measures not individual productivity but the performance of a laborer 
compared to others in what are normalizing workings of a social machine. The valuation of labor 
thus has less to do with individual worth or value as with abstract measurements necessitated by 
an economic system that is social.  
Exchange value and use value are likewise determined by their social context. For 
exchange value to emerge, an exchange (or at least an assumed one)—a social transaction 
between individuals—is necessitated. Similarly, a use value, for it to have value at all, has to be a 
social use value. That is to say, “unless the commodity satisfies a social want or need [i.e. is 
                                                
according to Postone, performs a critique of “the form of production and the form of wealth (that is, value) that 
characterize capitalism, rather than simply calling into question their private appropriation.” Postone, 17. 
30 Which implies that these different forms cannot be understood in isolation from each other 
31 Harvey, 14 
32 Cited in Harvey, 15. 
33 Harvey, 15. 
34 Harvey, 14. 
35 This, as I discuss on chapter 3, leads to fetishism, which is key to the extraction of surplus. Also see Harvey, 17. 
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something of value to others], it can have neither exchange value nor [use] value.”36 Thus “value 
has to be created in production and realized through exchange and consumption if it is to remain 
value.”37 The determination and realization of value, then, in its different forms, presuppose the 
context of social relations of individuals that leads to the emergence of value in the first place. 
The social character of value (which makes it possible) but betrays what is already 
apparent in the dialectical relations between its different forms (which gives them some 
determination). That is to say, value (the ontological reality) is nothing but the manifestation or 
expression—in abstract, numerical forms (mediated by money)—of the political economic 
formation (in this context, a capitalist one) as a social relationship between the individuals 
(performing activity) in that formation. True to its task as a philosophical conception, what 
“[Marx’s] value theory [. . . does is] to reflect and embody the essential social relations that lie at 
the heart of the capitalist mode of production.”38 Marx’s move is of course made possible by the 
phenomenon of alienation/abstraction and quantification/valorization standard in the capitalist 
social formation itself. 
Specifying what is meant by social relations, Marx asserts that the fundamental relation 
in the capitalist political economy is the division between labor and capital (the most general 
form that the division of labor takes). What gives the different economic activities in the social 
formation—and the forms of value that express them—their specifically capitalistic shape and 
configuration is, in Harvey’s words, “the separation of the labourer from the instruments of 
production [. . . and] the expropriation of the direct producers from the land”—means of 
production that are then taken over by the capitalist (in which they become the capitalist’s 
                                                
36 Harvey, 8. 
37 Harvey, 16. 
38 Harvey, 15. Interpreting Marx’s statement that values “express the forms of being, the determinations of existence 
[. . .] of this specific society,” Postone reads values as “categories of a critical ethnography of capitalist society 
undertaken from within—categories that purportedly express the basic forms of social objectivity and subjectivity 
that structure the social, economic, historical, and cultural dimensions of life in that society, and are themselves 
constituted by determinate forms of social practice.” Postone, 18. This is in line with Harvey’s interpretation. 
However, while Postone does state that “the category of value expresses that basic relations of production of 
capitalism—those social relations that specifically characterize capitalism as a mode of social life—[. . . just] as 
production in capitalism is based on value” and that “value [is] the social form of wealth, which, in turn [. . . 
corresponds to] the determinate mode of producing developed under capitalism,” Postone’s relation of (ontological) 
value to (material social) relations falls short. Postone, 24, 27. This is because he does not link ontological 
categories (that, according to him, due to the alienating capitalist conditions of labor, acquire “a peculiar, quasi-
objective character”) to subjective class relations from which they are alienated and that personify them. Postone, 
29. While asserting that “relations are [. . .] constituted by labor itself, [. . . Postone nonetheless concludes that the 
objective categories emanating from those relations] cannot be grasped fully in terms of class relations.” Postone, 
29. This leads Postone to a “categorial” rather than a “class-centered” interpretation of capitalist social relations that 
makes him posit an “abstract domination” not by one class of another but by “abstract social structures that people 
themselves constitute” in which “a form of social wealth [. . .] confronts living labor (the workers) as structurally 
alien and dominant power.” Postone, 30. While abstraction and alienation do in fact take place in the capitalist 
political economy (and while Postone’s characterizations of abstract domination are very pointed), what Postone 
neglects is that this abstract domination, the abstract structure, is caused by the particular structuring of the political 
economy in which one class dominates over the other, of which the ontological categories of value, as he says, are 
manifestations of that very relationship of unequal power. In effect, by separating categories from classes, Postone 
empties out abstract (objective) categories of their material (subjective) content. This leads him to focus on the 
“opposition between individuals and society, which is constituted [through alienation] as an abstract structure,” 
without taking account of the power relations that caused that alienation/abstraction in the first place and that 
perpetuate it. Postone, 30. In contrast, my approach, inspired by Harvey and Negri, links the objective categories (as 
forces) and the subjective social relations (personified by the classes). I elaborate on the paragraphs that follow. 
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property), referring to them as capital.39 Thus labor is separated from all other means of 
production (at least in terms of ownership) as capital is divided from labor. The result of this is 
not only to divide labor and capital from each other; as forces labor and capital become, in a 
further alienation, separate and distinct from the human beings that ‘work’ them, from which 
they derive. These alienated forces, then, divided from each other, fulfill structural roles in the 
political economy that are fundamentally different from each other, which defines their relation, 
their division—and human relations.  
The two main social forces of labor and capital, Marx asserts, are concretized in the 
social formation in the form of classes: the class of laborers and the class of capitalists. There 
are, it seems, more than just two classes in society.40 Marx points out, however, that despite the 
seeming variety, the different groupings tend to concentrate and ultimately belong to either labor 
or capital.41 This is because, as is manifested in mechanisms such as alienation, exploitation, and 
accumulation, the various groupings in society share what work the forces perform (depending 
on with which force they are aligned), premised as the relationship between the forces (and 
hence between the classes) is on power. Hence other, different groupings in society (including 
groupings that have their origin from past social formations), due to the structural function that 
they fulfill, in the end belong to one class or the other. As the main forces in the dominant 
organization of activity in the political economy, labor and capital are able to align the 
multifarious divisions in society (especially as the capitalist form of activity becomes more and 
more pervasive) into the two main classes that are their embodiments. 
This renders the divisions within the classes less important than the division between the 
forces. As Harvey points out, despite the divisions within the classes, “the class relation between 
capital and labour is of an entirely different sort compared with the social relations holding 
between different fractions of the capitalist class (industrialists, merchants, rentiers and money 
capitalists, landlords, etc.)” and between classifications within the class of laborers.42 This is 
made apparent in the fundamental difference between, on the one hand, the gap in remuneration 
between the laborers43 and the capitalists; and, on the other, the division of returns that fractions 
of the capitalist class negotiate with each other.44 
                                                
39 Harvey, 42. I elaborate on the relation between labor and capital and what defines them in the paragraphs that 
follow and especially in chapter 3, which further specifies the definition of the capitalist social formation. I elaborate 
on the division of capital from labor in chapter 4 when I discuss what Marx calls primitive accumulation. 
40 Harvey points out that in the The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Marx himself breaks down that 
particular society into “lumpenproletariat, industrial proletariat, a petite bourgeoisie, a capitalist class factionalized 
into industrialists and financiers, a landed aristocracy and a peasant class.” Harvey, 26. 
41 This contrasts with Marx’s approach in his more historical writings. See, for example, Karl Marx, The Class 
Struggles in France, in Karl Marx: Selected Writings, 2nd ed., ed. David McLellan (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), 313-325, and Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, in Karl Marx: Selected 
Writings, 2nd ed., ed. David McLellan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 329-355.  
42 Harvey, 43. 
43 Harvey explains that “total variable capital” is divided among heterogeneous individual laborers depending on 
“degree of skill, extent of union power, customary structures of remuneration, age and seniority, individual 
productivity, relative scarcity in particular labour markets (sectoral or geographical) and so on.” (Heterogeneous 
labor does, however, as I explain in chapter 3, have the tendency to be turned into abstract labor, thereby reducing 
skilled to simple labor. See Harvey, 57-61.) This is the problem of the division of “the variable capital (or total wage 
bill) [. . .] among the various individuals within the working class” that Marx does not seem to have discussed, 
which Harvey, in accordance with Marx’s principles, elaborates on. Harvey, 44. 
44 Harvey, 43. Harvey explains that surplus value is distributed among individual capitalists (in the form of interest, 
rent, merchant profit, profit of enterprise, taxes, etc.) (after having deducted the wage paid to labor) “according to 
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As the relation that is key to the workings of the capitalist political economy, the 
structural relation between labor and capital is thus the focus of Marx’s critique. Marx asserts 
that the embodiment of these forces are classes—individual and relational groups rather than 
isolated individual persons—because, following his argument, no individual capitalist or laborer 
performs everything that capital and/or labor do such that he exhausts how the forces define the 
shape and workings of the political economy. The forces, to put it crudely, are much bigger than 
individual (real-life) persons functioning or working by them, seeing as these forces, operating 
autonomously (separate from particular individuals), affect the social formation in a way that no 
one individual (especially if acting alone) can. The forces of labor and capital, after all, are social 
forces. 
To illustrate, Harvey argues (following Marx argues) that it takes a group (either the 
whole group, a part of it that dominates, or a subsection, as in those belonging to a particular 
industry, depending on what is being enacted) of capitalists—i.e. the class—to organize 
production in a certain way such that it—again, the class—is able to do capital’s work (i.e. 
ensure that it ever increases). Similarly, it takes groups of laborers—ideally, the class as a 
whole—to potently bargain with the capitalist class not only to ensure better conditions for itself 
but so as to prevent labor, in capital’s unbridled drive to accumulation, from being liquidated. 
This prevention is, paradoxically, also part of the task of the capitalist class in organizing 
production, labor being an essential part of capital’s operation. Thus, ironically enough, both the 
capitalist and the laboring classes, together and despite fundamental difference, ensure that the 
capitalist system (like a reproductive organism) continues its work.45  
The emphasis on classes is the advance that Marx makes over traditional political 
economy, that of Ricardo in particular (whose labor theory of value is the basis for Marx’s own 
theory of value). While traditional political economy is content to take as its unit of analysis the 
individual capitalist and the individual laborer (as schematic figures46), Marx recognizes that 
alone (i.e. as a sole individual), the capitalist and the laborer are powerless—force-less—or at 
least ineffective in effecting the much touted supply and demand equilibrium that is at the core of 
all analyses by traditional political economy (and modern economics).  
In emphasizing forces as they are embodied by classes, Marx did not, however, mean to 
say that leaders within the classes do not emerge or that no exceptional individual can serve at 
the helm of structural functioning or as lever for structural change. It has to be recognized, 
however, that individual leaders themselves come from a social context (in which their 
emergence was made possible by relations with other individuals, not to mention other social 
                                                
the rules of competition” such that the average rate of profit is equalized, which “has nothing necessarily to do with 
maximizing the aggregate output of surplus value in society.” Harvey, 45, 61, 68. Marx describes this division of 
surplus value as a “capitalist communism” that goes by the rule, “From each capitalist according to his total 
workforce and to each capitalist according to his total investment.” Marx, Selected Correspondence (with Engels), 
206, cited in Harvey, 63. This is the problem of the transformation of values into prices of production, which 
determines “the manner in which surplus value is distributed among capitalist producers,” another area that Marx 
does not elaborate on, which Harvey does. Harvey, 44. For a more elaborate discussion, see Harvey, 61-74. 
Interestingly enough, Morishima, using modern mathematical techniques to make sense of Marx’s calculations in 
the second volume of Capital, shows that “the equalization of the rate of profit under competition will disrupt the 
balance required for equilibrium growth.” Morishima, Marx’s Economics, 125-127, cited in Harvey, 171. 
45 See Harvey’s more detailed discussion on, 28-35.  
46 As opposed to particular individuals or real-life persons 
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factors) and that exceptional push does require collective following and support (as with great 
generals and their army).47  
In order to discern, then, the workings labor and capital (forces), it is the dynamic 
between classes (social groupings embodying them) that Marx probes into. Marx, however, does 
also employ the terms laborer and capitalist. As with traditional political economy, these 
schematic figures are to be distinguished from particular, real-life, individual persons. The 
laborer and the capitalist are individual, structural personifications of the economic forces of 
labor and capital (respectively). These personifications are really positions occupied by real-life 
persons depending on the role that they play in the political economy, i.e. depending on which 
function of which force they are performing.  
In other words, forces (labor, capital) have corresponding personifications (the laborer, 
the capitalist), of which there are many instances (e.g. factory laborer, industrial farmer, 
salesperson, branch manager; chief executive officer, chief financial officer, venture capitalist) 
fulfilling different roles (although ultimately they perform the work of the force that they 
instantiate). Real-life individual persons live out—personify—these particular roles, in which 
they (provided that the material conditions are there) can and sometimes must switch from one 
role to another (as when a local business is bought out by a chain and the former owner is made 
to work for the buyer), or play more than one simultaneously (as with employees who own 
stocks of the company that they work for). 
The individual, schematic figures of the laborer and the capitalist provide insight as to 
how the dynamic of forces is worked out among individuals, especially when it comes to 
differences within and changes in the classes. Like value itself, however, the laborer and the 
capitalist must be put in their social contexts, i.e. as belonging to their respective groups (the 
class of laborers and the capitalist class) of which the schematic personifications and the real-life 
persons that personify them are a part. For this reason, it is perhaps better, when referring to the 
personifications, to use the terms collective laborer and collective capitalist.48 The collective that 
the laborer and the capitalist belong to, it must further be remembered, are the potent and 
effective units in the social formation since it is these classes (rather than individuals) that are 
capable of performing the forces’ work (and of disrupting it). 
Thus if there is ‘equilibrium’ in the economy as traditional political economy likes to 
portray it, it is brought about not by individual actors exercising free will in a self-regulating 
market. If anything, individual personifications (and, more so, actual persons) are brought along 
by the collective groupings—the classes—in the social context where they belong. The structural 
functioning of the capitalist system, Marx argues, is really determined by the necessary but 
antithetical relationship (i.e. dialectical) between the capitalist class and the class of laborers.49 
These classes, it must be remembered, are the concrete manifestations of economic forces that, 
                                                
47 Just as the class exerts enormous influence and pressure on the individual, so is an individual (or, more precisely, 
some individuals), for good or bad, able to take charge of the class. To cushion the dangers of “intuitive 
vanguardism” that is a hallmark of totalitarian variants of actually existing communism, Marxist Antonio Negri 
espouses “mass action,” or, more precisely, the combination of “the vanguard and the mass process, Lenin and 
Luxemburg.” Negri, 192, 198. See Michael Ryan’s epilogue to Antonio Negri, Marx Beyond Marx: Lessons on the 
Grundrisse, trans. Harry Cleaver, Michael Ryan, and Maurizio Viano, ed. Jim Fleming (Brooklyin: Autonomedia, 
1991). 
48 This is what Negri does in Marx Beyond Marx, although instead of collective laborer, Negri uses collective 
worker. See Negri, 71. I make a subtle distinction between work and labor in chapter 4. 
49 As is illustrated above by the mechanism by which the capitalists and laborers, negotiating with each other as 
classes, preserve—reproduce—the capitalist system 
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while indeed deriving from human subjects, are derived socially—i.e. derived from human 
individuals working together, socially—and as such are able to be—with force—(re)directed also 
only socially, by social collectives—by the classes. 
Even the term ‘equilibrium,’ however, is misleading. The quasi-stable state that the class 
relation settles on, which reproduces the system, is, as Marx’s critique shows, hardly an equal 
relationship between the capitalist class and the class of laborers. If anything, it is a dialectical 
power relation in which both classes constantly struggle (as with their negotiations).50 The 
assumption that individuals act on their own, exercising rationality and free will, does not take 
into account differences in their power (social, economic, intellectual, etc.), not to mention the 
class in which they belong.51 
Marx’s critique goes beyond this, however. Zeroing in on exchange itself, supposedly the 
activity in which equilibrium is most manifest, Marx questions the equality of the values being 
exchanged, taken by traditional political economy and modern economics as a given. 
Technically, exchange as an activity rests on the principle of equivalence in the market.52 This, 
however, as Harvey explains, relies on an underlying mechanism in which “diverse use values 
produced under diverse concrete conditions of human labour are all reduced in the course of 
market exchange to the same standard,” thanks to the process of abstraction (from qualities) 
(products become commodities) and their measurement (in quantity) according to a common 
standard, money (itself a commodity).53 This enables the process by which one “would not 
exchange one use value for another under conditions of free exchange unless [one] valued the 
two at least equally well,” these values being recorded, it must be remembered, in the money 
commodity.54 Hence the assumption that what happens in market exchange is a changing of 
hands of equal values (as measured by money). Hence supply and demand equilibrium. 
There is, however, as both modern economics and Marx’s critique concede, an anomaly 
in the exchange (or more broadly, the circulation). At the end of the exchange, supposedly an 
equal change of hands, someone makes a (monetary) profit.55 Admittedly, not all capitalists 
succeed. Instead of profits, some businesses do suffer losses, in which case they may go 
bankrupt. If this happens, however, (this is one of the instances in which the distinction between 
the individual personifications and the classes prove useful) the particular, individual capitalist is 
taken out of his place in the economic system. More precisely, the owner of the business changes 
personification as larger firms take over his business (usually raising prices) and the former 
capitalist becomes a laborer. This is the process that Marx refers to as increasing 
proletarianization or the tendency towards monopolization in what is a highly competitive 
capitalist economy. Thus, even as individual capitalists come and go, the capitalist class—so 
long as the social formation is capitalist (at the same time that the class perpetuates it)—remains. 
The class is able to do so because overall, profits are, indeed, made, which allows the collective 
                                                
50 I demonstrate more of this in chapter 3. 
51 Modern economics does take into account delay and imperfections in the market—but as qualifications to the 
assumption of equilibrium. 
52 This relies on the tacit assumption of private property and the ability to enforce contracts (usually by the State). 
Harvey, 18. 
53 Harvey, 20. This is related to the phenomenon of fetishism that I discuss in chapter 3. 
54 Harvey, 19. 
55 It is in fact the case that some commodities are sold at a discount, but this is usually outweighed by the volume of 
the commodity sold or by the sale of other commodities (e.g. accessories). 
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capitalist from being proletarianized, i.e. enables him to separate himself from the collective 
laborer.  
Profit, according to Marx, roots from the fundamental exchange that underlies all 
transactions of exchange in the economy: namely, the exchange of labor for wage. In the 
capitalist economy, the collective laborer sells his labor power to the collective capitalist, 
exchanging the product of his work (in the form of material) for wage (in the form of money). In 
other words, labor, in a political relationship, is employed by capital to produce a good, which is 
the commodity that then goes out to the market to be exchanged (to fulfill use values). As the 
exchange on which all other exchanges in the capitalist political economy is based, the exchange 
of labor for wage is thus the first instance in which profit (or something like it) materializes.  
Marx represents exchange in general through the C-M-C and M-C-M schemas (whereby 
C stands for commodities and M for money), illustrating the exchange process from its two 
(mirror) sides, the standpoint of the buyer and of the seller.56 Through this schema, the anomaly 
is revealed. Whereas C-M-C is characterized by a qualitative difference in the commodities 
being exchanged (e.g. labor power that earns the laborer money, which the laborer then uses to 
buy some commodity already in its final form and which targets his needs), which is what 
motivates the process (hence the schema really stands for C1-M-C2), on the seller’s side of the 
circulation, M-C-M, one ends up with the exact same commodity (money) as one began with.57 
There is thus no reason why the individual in possession of money would want to participate in 
exchange—except if the exchange is unequal, i.e. except if (since there is no qualitative 
difference) there is a quantitative difference involved in the process.58 Thus, M-C-M takes place 
if, in reality (or at least presumably), it is M-C-M’, where M’ > M, or where M’ = M + 
something more.  
Thus what makes possible exchange (which follows production and distribution as the 
next step at the same time as, in leading to consumption, it feeds further production) is the fact 
that there is one commodity—money—that seemingly makes more of itself—automatically 
produces, as it were—by simply being thrown into circulation (and not even the production 
process where all other commodities are produced). “Money is thrown into circulation to make 
more money—a profit,” in which case (if it succeeds) money (the commodity) becomes 
capital.59 Capital is of course driven by a force of the same name, a magical, as it were, purely 
exchange-based expansion of value through the emergence of a fourth form of value: surplus 
value.60 This is the something more of the M-C-M’ schema, the Mehrwert.61 This surplus value 
is then reinvested as surplus capital (becomes the new starting point of activity, buys up new 
resources for production), enabling capital to repeat the cycle (M’-C-M’’ . . .) in a surplus-
generating process whose excess, each time, capital accumulates to itself. 
Surplus value, then, is what drives the system, what sets into course not only exchange 
but production, distribution, and consumption in the capitalist political economy, of which 
exchange is the link. In other words, the production and extraction of something more—surplus 
                                                
56 Marx elaborates on this in Karl Marx, Capital, vol. 1, in Karl Marx: Selected Writings, 2nd ed., ed. David 
McLellan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 452-525. 
57 Harvey, 13. 
58 Harvey, 13. 
59 Harvey, 13. 
60 Harvey, 20. 
61 The violation of the ‘equivalence’ of exchange is, in truth, but a displacement of a contradiction fundamental to 
the system. Harvey, 22. See the paragraphs that follow and chapter 3. 
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value—is the presupposition on which the capitalist political economy relies, which gives 
shape—organizes—economic activity in the political economy such that the social formation—
capitalism—is historically constructed and maintains itself (ideally, into perpetuity). Along with 
the system is maintained the class which is the personification of its dominant force, the 
capitalist class, and the other subordinate class, the class of laborers, which is equally essential as 
it provides the political economy’s first, fundamental exchange, and much more (being as 
capitalists and laborers are in a dialectical relation).62 Surplus value is thus what leads to, drives, 
and keeps the capitalist political economy going. 
It must be noted that surplus value, as the presupposition, as illustrated in its emergence 
in the M-C-M’ schema, goes beyond any individual human will or desire. As Harvey points out, 
“even in the absence of diverse human motivations (the lust for gold, the greed for social power 
and the desire to dominate),” surplus value would have to emerge because it is the lever that the 
whole system is premised on.63 As such, the emergence of surplus value and the extraction of 
profit is a structural feature of the system, a necessary presupposition without which the system 
would not be constituted, a systemic principle beyond any characteristic or ability of the human, 
or any other individual element in the political economy. 
In being driven by an anomaly structural to it, capitalism reveals a basic contradiction at 
the heart of the system. As Harvey puts it, while exchange “rests on the principle of 
equivalence,” ultimately “the capitalist form of circulation rests upon an inequality because 
capitalists possess more money (values) at the end of the process than they did at the 
beginning.”64 This happens as, in its morphing into its different forms, something goes terribly 
amiss with value—out of nowhere, a new form emerges, a surplus is derived!—which, ironically 
enough, fuels the system. The concrete, material incarnation of capitalism’s contradictory 
premise is thus surplus value, which, in displacing the contradiction (of equivalence and 
inequality), allows the system to continue to move in both senses that it hides the contradiction, 
thus maintaining the stability of the system; and in being hidden, it is consummated as fuel for 
further movement. 
Surplus value is of course but one form of the more general ontological reality that is 
value, which, as Marx shows, is but the abstract expression of concrete power relations 
manifested by the two classes—capital and labor—in the social political economy. Like all other 
forms of value, then, surplus value is indicative of the social relations in the system. By looking 
at value, we can get a glimpse of how capitalism works and its inherent and unique features (e.g. 
innovation, inequality, crises, etc.). Specifically, the dynamics between labor value, use value, 
and exchange value shed light on the social relations in the political economy.  
By looking at surplus value, however, we can go even further. Surplus value is unique in 
that it is the direct manifestation of the system’s fundamental contradiction, a contradiction from 
which, as in all such social relations, power is derived (played out as this politics is in capitalism 
between the classes), which assures the smooth—economic (in the sense of efficient and 
effective)—working of the system. As the crux of the different value forms and of social 
                                                
62 I elaborate on how exactly the class of laborers is essential in chapter 3. It is tempting to say that just as capitalism 
maintains the classes, in a reciprocal manner, the capitalist class acts as the agent that maintains the capitalist 
system. As established above, however, whether directly or indirectly, both the capitalist class and the class of 
laborers, paradoxically, function ultimately—structurally—to maintain the capitalist system. 
63 Harvey, 21. 
64 Harvey, 21. For more on the conflict between the process of accumulation inherent in capitalist production (that 
leads to such inequities) and the principle of balanced exchange, see Harvey, 157-176. 
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relations in the political economy in general, surplus value thus intimates something about the 
power that informs the said relations and the ultimate fate of the capitalist social formation as a 
whole. It is precisely this—surplus value, its origin, its mechanisms, and its systemic 
consequences—that I set out to investigate in this thesis. 
It is important, however, that in the inquiry, both the metaphysical and historical 
dimensions of value be taken into account (and distinguished from each other).65 Just as the 
historical incarnation of value will clarify the specificity of social relations under capitalism, so 
will its metaphysical concept enlighten its universal mechanisms (from which the particular 
historical form draws). Just as the metaphysical may reify what are historical constructions 
(which, as historical, can be changed), so must the conditional specificity and time constraints 
(i.e. relative short-sightedness) of the historical be cushioned to see what are universal workings 
(hence universally applicable) of the virtual reality. With that, I begin my inquiry into 
(metaphysical) excess in the historical form (profit or surplus value) that it takes in the capitalist 
social formation. 
                                                
65 This distinction between the metaphysical and historical has been specified thanks to a similar distinction that 
Postone makes in Time, Labor, and Social Domination, where he distinguishes his historical approach that critiques 
labor in its form in capitalism from the metaphysical approach of traditional Marxism that performs a critique of 
capitalism from the point of view of labor. See Postone, chapter 1. While Postone, however, equates the 
metaphysical approach with an undue focus on distribution as opposed to his historical approach that tackles the 
problem from the perspective of production, my approach is both historical (chapters 2 and 3) and metaphysical 
(chapter 4) and I see production and distribution (along with exchange and distribution) as (similar to Harvey) 
distinct activities forming an organic unity.  
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Chapter 2: The Ideological Claim on Surplus 
Marx complains of Ricardo’s political economy that it determines the value of labor 
based on the law of supply and demand. This, Marx argues in the Theories of Surplus Value, 
reduces labor value to its means of subsistence, which reflects merely “what is necessary for the 
maintenance and reproduction of laborers” and not the full value of what labor produces.66 This 
is but one symptom of Ricardo’s whole economic approach. “Ricardo,” Marx continues, “starts 
out from the actual fact of capitalist production,” considering “commodities of a given value [. . . 
that already contain] a given quantity of labor” rather than the production process where labor is 
still dynamic (or, in Deleuze’s terms, intensive), actively involved in the process. Because of 
this, Ricardo, Marx assesses, “investigates neither the origin of surplus value nor [of] absolute 
surplus value.”67 By starting out with a whole set of givens (what Deleuze, following Marx, 
would refer to as the actual)—such as the assumption that labor composition and the working 
day are constant—Ricardo overlooks certain parts of the (intensive) production process, leading 
him to an economics that misconstrues the workings of the capitalist political economy.68  
This critique of Ricardo is but an instance of Marx’s more extensive critique of the study 
of political economy in general. As Marx asserts, “political economy starts with the fact of 
private property,” “the separation of labor and capital,” competition, etc.—i.e. the (actual) fact of 
capitalism—calculating how the system works (as it takes the stance of the capitalist) without 
explaining how it (intensively) came to be and acknowledging that it is but one economic system 
(in Deleuzian terms, one idea in the virtual) (albeit currently the dominant one) among many.69 
Classical or orthodox economics, then, by simply demonstrating the workings of capitalism, 
obscures certain processes from view.70 One of these processes, as Marx mentions, is the 
generation of surplus value.  
True enough, modern economics (which political economy has evolved into)—whether 
Keynesian, neoclassical, or neoliberal71—does not discuss surplus value. Textbooks in 
                                                
66 Karl Marx, Theories of Surplus Value in Karl Marx: Selected Writings, 2nd ed., ed. David McLellan (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), 434. 
67 Marx, Surplus Value, 436, 440, 438. 
68 Marx, Surplus Value, 442. 
69 Karl Marx, “Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts,” in Karl Marx: Selected Writings, 2nd ed., ed. David 
McLellan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 85. 
70 Within mainstream economics it can be argued that Keynesian economics is exempted from Marx’s critique. 
71 Responding to the laissez-faire tendencies of Smith and Ricardo’s classical economics (that argued that the 
economy is composed of free, equal, and rational individuals in a self-regulating market), Keynesian or Liberal 
economics was developed by John Maynard Keynes during the Great Depression to argue that, over and above the 
‘free individuals’ of the classical model, the State has a role to play in the economy in speeding up the process by 
which it reaches equilibrium (hence its interventionist implications). Neoclassical economics, in turn, was a response 
to Keynesian economics in the crises of the seventies and eighties when presidents like Ronald Reagan and Margaret 
Thatcher enacted policies that called for low taxes, ‘balanced’ budgets, the reversal of New Deal welfare policies, 
and the removal of government constraints on private business in general. The neo- in neoclassical signals that the 
new economics is no mere return to the past but is an advance. True enough, there was in neoclassical economics 
tacit acceptance that the State would (and should) intervene—if only to make sure it wouldn’t (and that businesses 
are duly represented). Neoliberal economics is, in many ways, the consummation of the neoclassical model as 
‘liberal’ governments of the West (especially the United States) sought to transform developing economies (through 
institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund) according to its own model (systematized by 
the Chicago School of economists, foremost of which was Milton Freedman). In essentially enforcing policies of 
deregulation and privatization around the world, neoliberal economics is thus a monstrous combination of classical 
and Keynesian economics in that a ‘liberal’ State intervenes to enforce classical, orthodox economic principles 
around the world: a new liberalism, indeed. Despite the seeming variety, then, among the supposedly different 
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introductory and intermediate economics, for example, do not mention the concept.72 Instead, the 
basic framework offered, as Marx points out, is the law of supply and demand, which, as two 
linear curves that meet at some equilibrium point, is used to find in virtually all economic 
phenomena the level of activity at which the economy is at its optimum (and is hence the 
desirable level).73 In the process, not only are the forces of supply and demand presented as 
natural, substantive, and “freely” determining (directed by the market’s “invisible hand”74), more 
importantly, in the very notion that optimality is reached through an equilibrating process, the 
notion that there is something extra, something more—i.e. surplus value—is concealed. 
As with all systematic, well-constituted, and dogmatic bodies of knowledge, however, 
light peers through in some holes, presenting opportunities for some unveiling. In industrial 
organization, for example, a core economic science that focuses on the behavior of firms, by 
fitting in numbers in the sale and cost equations (curves distinct from each other), the economist 
can compute how much profit a firm may make, implying a gap between two processes (or two 
steps in a process), which concretely leads to something extra for the producer or seller. The 
level of activity at which the firm is in operation, however, is still determined by an equilibrium 
point, although there are at least two graphs involved—that pertaining to the supply and demand 
of the product, which is what is recorded by the sale; and that recorded by the cost, which 
involves the supply and demand of labor and raw materials needed to produce the product, a 
previous ‘sale,’ as it were—in which the latter is deducted from the former.  
The point of view taken in this operation is always that of the capitalist (i.e. the question 
asked is “How do I make more profits?”). The term profit is perhaps symptomatic of the whole 
operation. Implying a return on investment, a gain (by someone), someone (by virtue of what he 
did) profiting from something, profit is attributed to who supposedly gained it—the capitalist—
in the process concealing the structural relations between social individuals involved in the 
economic process. 
                                                
strands, economics maintains the core assumption of equilibrium. For more on Keynesian economics and its 
potentials and problems for progressive politics, see footnote 89 of this chapter. 
72 See, for example, Robert Pindyck and Daniel Rubinfeld, Microeconomics, 7th ed. (Upper Saddle River: Prentice 
Hall, 2008), and Andrew B. Abel, Ben S. Bernanke, and Dean Croushoure, Macroeconomics, 6th ed. (Upper Saddle 
River: Prentice Hall, 2008). Introductory and intermediate college courses are, I argue, crucial discursive sites for 
the ‘ideological claim’ that I talk about in this section in that it is in these courses that most people receive their 
education in economics, if any. Granted, surplus value may be tackled in advanced economics classes, say in 
graduate seminars. But how many people go off to study economics in the advanced level? Even then, their views 
have already been somewhat fixed.  
73 Examples of economic phenomena (and the branch of economics that analyzes them) include: the level of local 
production (microeconomics), long-run economic performance (macroeconomics), a firm’s productive capacity 
(industrial organization), interest rates (monetary economics), taxation and welfare policies (public economics), 
wage (labor economics), the housing market and public utilities (urban and regional economics), underdeveloped 
economies (development economics), and the dynamic between markets (international economics). In all of this, the 
economist uses the one tool at his disposal: the drawing (thanks to statistics) of the X of the supply and demand of a 
commodity, which, at the point where these two ‘natural’ forces meet, is supposedly the ‘optimum’ point at which 
commodities should be produced. Commodities can be of all types, e.g. basic individual necessities such as food and 
shelter; a firm’s product (what, how many, at what price) or the labor assigned to produce it; public utilities such as 
roads, amenities (that lead to the construction of city zones), and the police; welfare goods such as unemployment 
benefits and public housing; charitable donations (to people and governments); customers to let in to a bar, students 
to be provided loans; etc. 
74 The reference is of course to Adam Smith.  
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Not all holes in the system are as easily covered up, however. In urban and regional 
economics, another subfield that focuses on location choice and geographical differences in 
economic activity, inequality demands that it be confronted directly.75 When one looks at the 
economic map of the United States, for example, if one were to graph on the map (with the map 
serving as the x axis) the economic activity (e.g. the amount of output produced) of specific 
regions (traced in the y axis), a glaring discrepancy makes itself noticed. The superimposed 
graph on the map would trace mountains (unequal) of economic activity in California, Chicago, 
and the Northeast (perhaps a hill in Texas) as it slumps (again, unequal) in all other regions.76  
In contrast to what is seen in all other economics subfields, then, in geographical 
economics, the assumption that economic activities (production, exchange, consumption) occur 
on a level playing field, at the optimum supply-and-demand meeting point where things are 
equalized, starts to break apart (as another economic activity, distribution, reveals its 
importance). For the assumption to hold that supply and demand are indeed determinant and that 
the market functions in a state of equilibrium, at the very least supply and demand curves would 
have to be extended over space, and there would have to be many of them. This would fail, 
however, to cover up the fact that, in the end, the equilibrium points reached (if they are reached 
at all) by many such curves are different from each other. Similarly, new questions arise: “Why 
is there more there than here?” “Why is this bigger than that?” “Why do things seem to 
concentrate in here when over there, it’s empty?”  
Economic activity is thus, unlike the equilibrium state painted by the infamous X of 
supply and demand, shown to be an unbalanced complexity of irreducible differences. 
Mainstream economics taken out of its Ideal state and spread over concrete geographical space 
cannot help but reveal irreducible inequalities among individual entities (spatially separate from 
each other). The disequilibrium revealed, like a hole that cannot be covered, a hole that only 
leads to bigger openings, thereby breaks a core assumption of economics: namely, the 
assumption of “all things being equal.” This then leads to even more curious things as economics 
now has to take into account inequality, concentration, and amalgamation, which it has to 
confront not from the perspective of returns (i.e. the profits that they lead to) but from their 
origin. Thereby the issue of excess is raised. Granted, it does this only 
geographically/comparatively, as it asks the questions, “Why is there more there than here?” 
“Where is the greater activity there coming from?” Nonetheless, surplus value (albeit unnamed) 
is, if only directly, posited as a theoretical entity. 
To account for excess, geographical economics invokes the concept of scale economies, 
which explains inequality over space (as in the construction of cities in a country) made possible 
by excess (in some way or other77) through savings. Briefly, scale economies refer to savings on 
costs that accrue to the different individual elements of the economy (e.g. firms, households, 
                                                
75 In another discipline, geography, the subfield of economic geography has strong affinities with the economic 
science of location. Interestingly enough, David Harvey, whose book Limits to Capital is used extensively in this 
thesis, made his reputation in economic geography. 
76 For this image, I am indebted to Anthony Yezer, professor of economics at The George Washington University, 
whose class on Urban and Regional Economics I took in the fall of 2003. Needless to say, the conclusions I came up 
with are very different from his. 
77 It is unclear whether the excess that geographical economics hits upon is produced or merely redistributed from 
one place to another. It is certain, however, that there is excess, which are the profits that the capitalist gets credit 
for. 
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etc.) by virtue of structuring production a certain way.78 Specifically, this structure is developed 
in a series of (interrelated) stages, which correspond to the way that Deleuze explains the 
structuration—the capture—of space in “Apparatus of Capture” from A Thousand Plateaus.  
According to geographical economics, producers begin exploiting potential savings by 
specializing on certain goods, which leads to savings on opportunity cost. The rationale behind 
this is that, in specializing in what an element produces most efficiently, the cost of not 
producing another good is less than the cost of not producing the good that the producer is most 
efficient at.79 As such, it befits different producers to specialize. This allows each element to save 
on opportunity cost. 
Opportunity cost, however, is merely potential. Producers need to go one step further to 
reap tangible savings. As such, producers relate to other producers to actualize the potential 
savings. This leads to a variety of tangible products in the economy in which producers are 
producing what they are most efficient at. Thus, after specializing, producers take a further step: 
they concentrate in a central location. Closer to each other, producers not only are able to 
exchange inputs and outputs with each other, saving on opportunity cost; they, in addition, save 
on transportation costs.80 This leads to the rise of what geographical economics refers to as 
market cities. 
The market city is what Deleuze, in his philosophy, calls the town. This change in terms, 
however, is not a mere analogy. In describing the phenomenon philosophically, Deleuze is able 
to explain that which geographical economics merely names. That is to say, Deleuze, through his 
philosophy, is able to show what mechanisms are at work in the emergence of the market city 
that lead to the savings on costs referred to by geographical economics.  
In Deleuze’s description,  
The town exists only as a function of circulation, and of circuits; it is a remarkable point 
on the circuits that create it, and which it creates. It is defined by entries and exits; 
something must enter it and exit from it [e.g. the commodities exchanged, the producers 
transacting business, etc.]. It imposes a frequency. It effects a polarization of matter, 
inert, living or human; it causes the phylum, the flow, [roughly anything that moves, 
unconstrained by some form, e.g. laborers, producers, goods, etc.] to pass through 
specific places, along horizontal lines [i.e. to follow a certain form].81  
 
In Deleuze’s interpretation, in other words, through the town, materials that flow (or are 
exchanged from one individual element to another) go through a hylomorphic process such that 
they gain a certain form. The resulting imposed form, I argue, is what causes the savings on 
costs. To put this back in the terminology of geographical economics, when different human 
activities (that lead to the production of different goods by the different elements)—i.e. the 
flow—passes through the market city—the town—a form is imposed on these activities and they 
are concentrated in a central location. The producers, then, due to the organization and efficiency 
imposed by the form, reap savings on transportation costs.  
It becomes apparent here that, in the case of the market city, the imposed form is none 
other than the urban form itself—the town—which concentrates different productions in a central 
                                                
78 Arthur O’Sullivan, Urban Economics, 5th ed. (Boston: McGraw-Hill Irwin, 2003), 22. 
79 O’Sullivan, 20-22. 
80 O’Sullivan, 22-23. 
81 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1987), 432. 
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location, thus leading to savings on costs. Through Deleuze’s concept of the town, then, the 
phenomenon that geographical economics takes for granted (“transportation costs” in the market 
city) are more clearly explained (as the result of hylomorphism, i.e. of the imposition of the town 
form).  
The imposition of the town form is but one way to achieve scale economies. 
Geographical economics schematizes another possibility in which, instead of the market city, 
what rise are factory cities. This happens, geographical economics explains, by virtue of 
producers agglomerating the production of the different productive elements. In agglomerating, 
geographical economics argues, producers are able to take full advantage of their productive 
capacity and thus save on production costs. Small-scale producers, e.g. households, are then 
subsumed by larger-scale producers (who have lower production cost per unit), the firms, 
combining their productive power into a larger scale, leading to lower costs for both.82 In this 
case, savings are achieved through merging or incorporation.  
The factory city is analogous to what Deleuze calls the state (form of city) (in contrast to 
the town). In Deleuze’s description,  
[The state] makes points [i.e. the different activities of the different producers] resonate 
together [i.e. be subsumed under one system, in this case the factory system headed by 
the firms]. [. . .] It operates by stratification [or a certain organization imposed where the 
firms are in charge and the households work for the firms]; in other words, it forms a 
vertical, hierarchized aggregate that spans the horizontal lines in a dimension of depth. In 
retaining given elements, it necessarily cuts off their relations with other elements, which 
become exterior, it inhibits, slows down, or controls those relations [so as to make 
dominate its system of production, i.e. the factory system, capitalism itself].83  
 
As the factory system becomes dominant, as the other elements (e.g. the households) end up 
working (as labor) for the firms (the capitalists), the different elements and the whole system, by 
producing on a larger scale and in a systematic fashion, are able to save on production costs. 
Deleuze argues that there is then a further process in which the town and the state are 
connected, leading to further savings. In “mak[ing] the town resonate with the countryside,” the 
state, Deleuze narrates, is then taken over by the State, which is not the state type of city but the 
state as we know it, i.e. a government and a people, a territory with a central authority. The town 
(i.e. the market city mentioned above), according to Deleuze, struggles against the State, but the 
State appropriates the town (although the town does not completely disappear)—and from there 
emerges further savings.84  
Translating this into geographical economics terminology, market cities are incorporated 
into factory cities that then form the State, a centralized power, one unified economy (that has a 
particular form, e.g. the capitalist political economy). This integration into an economy, 
according to geographical economics, is another source of scale economies since, once 
integrated, the different elements in the economy are able to share certain resources (e.g. 
security, research, etc.) and jointly determine the level of costs (through so-called ‘competitive’ 
principles), lowering maintenance costs. While market and factory cities then see the emergence 
                                                
82 O’Sullivan, 23-26. 
83 Deleuze and Guattari, Plateaus, 433. 
84 Deleuze and Guattari, Plateaus, 433, 434. 
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of internal scale economies, the integrated economy, the State, sees the emergence of external 
economies.85 
This whole mechanism (that geographical economics calls scale economies) allows not 
only the individual elements but the whole economy to save more as it produces more, leading to 
more goods at lower costs per unit, enlarging the discrepancy between the two, generating an 
increasing extra—which economics calls profit. These savings on costs leading to larger profits 
are then attributed to the great strategic or managerial skills of the capitalist leader. It is 
insightful that even geographical economics (like other economic sciences) thinks of this process 
as a saving on costs rather than the generation of surplus value, as though thinking about it 
negatively allows it to give credit to the one presumably doing the saving—the capitalist—hiding 
the positive actuality of what is generated so as not to account for where it was obtained.  
To put this in Deleuzian terms, what economics does is to impose a tracing relationship 
between the production process and its products (including the surplus value produced). In one 
of A Thousand Plateaus, the “Rhizomes,” Deleuze describes a tracing relationship as one that 
follows a hylomorphic schema in which form is imposed on matter (or matter is made to 
exemplify form), leaving no room for difference (or the singularity of the material), hence 
resulting in a product that is exactly the same as what was planned in the production process.86 In 
such a relationship, what was planned in the production process is thought to account for the 
product in its totality. Even the surplus value produced, in other words, is thought to be 
accounted for by the production plan(ner). Economics extends this structural tracing relationship 
by positing a human entity—the capitalist—that does the planning, thereby attributing surplus 
value to the individual capitalist agent.  
So-called form, however, like the one imposed on the economy, is by no means ‘natural.’ 
There is no reason why this particular form (e.g. the town or the factory system) and not some 
other (e.g. production by artisans) is imposed on the production of material. There is no inherent 
connection, in other words, between form and the matter on which it is imposed. Rather, as the 
narrative above shows, form results out of dynamics of economy (the efficiency and 
effectiveness by which things are done or produced) in which individual elements organize 
themselves in their activity. In a later political act, these individual elements are taken over from 
above by a force that, indeed, results from their interaction, but is nonetheless external from and 
independent of them—the State, which, along with the state or social formation in general, is 
dominated by a class, the capitalist class. This State then consolidates from the unruly and 
tentative arrangements of the individual elements a determinate political economy: e.g. 
capitalism. 
Form—in this context the capitalist political economy as the form of human activity—
even though sketched by the economy of individual elements, is an imposition by a central 
authority, the State, in a political act. This same hylomorphic authority then uses the form it has 
imposed to perform further political acts, such as the determination of what productive element 
surplus value is attributed to—i.e. to the capitalist—thereby distributing its benefits. Reminiscent 
of Marxist discourse, the State, as it turns out, is an organ of the dominant class.87 Not only does 
it organize and unify production (or activity in general) in the economy; it ensures, in a political 
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86 Deleuze and Guattari, Plateaus, 12. 
87 For more on Marx’s writings on the State, see German Ideology. Also see Louis Althusser, “Ideology and 
Ideological State Apparatuses,” in Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays (New York: Monthly Review Press, 
2001). 
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act, that surplus is appropriated by the economy’s dominant class, the capitalists.88 In emerging 
from the whole economy composed not only of capitalists but also of other individual elements 
(especially laborers), the political act moreover appears to have an official sanction, as though it 
was representative of the general interest. ‘Official’ sciences then, like economics, overlay the 
legitimation of the political act with presumption of objectivity (as when it separates the political 
from economics). 
Geographical economics, however, does deserve some credit for taking into account the 
structural relations in the political economy. After all, what leads to the generation of surplus in 
its account is the combination of the different productive elements—the firms, the laborers, the 
suppliers of intermediate goods, the public sector, etc.—and their particular arrangement in the 
system. Then again, what determines that particular arrangement are, according to economics, 
individual agents—i.e. the firms, the capitalists—with their ability to decide where to locate and 
how to organize such arrangement. What geographical economics posits, in other words, is a 
structure organized by the transcendent genius of capitalist planning. Thereby the capitalist claim 
on surplus value—profit—by virtue of the capitalist making the decision that leads to savings on 
costs—is legitimated.89 For this reason, geographical economics has limited value in performing 
                                                
88 I don’t mean to imply that the political and the economic are separate: relationships of efficiency and 
effectiveness are relations of power. 
89 It should be noted that there are economists who attempt to evade some of these ‘conservative’ tendencies of the 
discipline. The work of Liberal economist Paul Krugman is an example. Briefly, what Krugman has done is to 
extend the notion of scale economies into international trade, arguing that because of scale economies, production 
tends to concentrate in certain regions. This is balanced by diverse consumption preferences that ensure the presence 
of different versions of the same product (which are produced from and consumed at different places) in the world 
market. Departing from the frameworks offered by Ricardo and twentieth-century economists Eli Hecksher, Bertil 
Ohlin, and Paul Samuelson, Krugman’s framework has come to be called new trade theory, which argues that since 
trade is shaped by scale economies, economic regions with the most production will be most profitable and, leading 
to even larger scale economies, attract further production. This leads to an uneven economic geography. What 
Krugman has done, in other words, is, like geographical economics in general, to incorporate scale economies 
(which attempt to account for inequality) in the classical equilibrium models, extending this into international 
economics (wherein lies Krugman’s advance). For more on Krugmans work, see Krugman’s 1991 Journal of 
Political Economy paper, “Increasing Returns and Economic Geography.” An overview to Krugman’s work is 
provided by economist Edward Glaesar in “Honoring Paul Krugman,” The New York Times, 13 October 2008, 
<http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/10/13/honoring-paul-krugman/>. Despite attempts like Krugman’s, 
however, the dominant strand of economics—especially its core values, methodology, and position in the political 
economy—does exert much pressure on its different schools, especially the outliers. Krugman tells the story of how, 
after publishing a major work, he had been left out of gatherings of professional economists headed by Alan 
Greenspan. The dominant strand of economics, moreover, carries much weight, despite the different political 
orientations of its practitioners. More importantly, no matter how different its schools may seem, by sharing some 
core doctrines (especially the notion of equilibrium), economics as a whole (more some of its practitioners than 
others) has the tendency of official science to reproduce the state that it is a discourse of. Krugman himself shares 
the some of these fundamental economic doctrines. After all, despite the complications that he incorporates into the 
model, in the end Krugman integrates them into the model of general equilibrium, although his orientation towards it 
is Keynesian. Michael Ryan illustrates how even Keynesian economics is an official State science when he discusses 
Negri’s critique of Keynesian economics in the epilogue to Marx Beyond Marx. Negri points out that Keynesianism, 
despite its Liberal stance, in assuming the norm of equilibrium (which is the goal of its interventionism) only 
allowed capital to “merge[] the economic and juridical, and made out any working class action which disturbed 
equilibrium to be illegal. [Thus] the Keynesian instruments of state interventionism and the management of 
circulation turned all of society into a factory. And economic development was assured by an alliance between the 
bourgeoisie and the socialists.” Negri, 193. In other words, all that Keynesianism accomplished (or tried to 
accomplish) was—through raised benefits, more job security, supposedly egalitarian policies, etc., i.e. by displacing 
the contradictions of the system—the utilization of the working class for further development of capital. Negri, 193. 
 25 
a critique of the political economy, specifically in figuring out the mechanisms of a phenomenon 
key to it—excess—in which, as official State science, it has a stake. 
To put it in another way, geographical economics demonstrates the classic hallmarks of 
what in Marxist thought is called ideology. In “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” 
Louis Althusser defines ideology as the representation of the imaginary relationship of 
individuals to their real conditions of existence. As soon as an individual is constituted as a 
subject (someone with some sense of himself and his relation with others), some representation 
of the subject’s relatedness or situatedness is constituted (or the subject enters the realm of 
representation), which is what is called ideology. In the sense that this representation is not the 
real relation itself but is an imaginary representation in the form of ideas, ideology is said to be 
an illusion, something imaginary. At the same time, it does have as its content reality (the real, 
material conditions of existence), to which it refers or alludes to. Ideology is thus both and at the 
same time an (imaginary) illusion/allusion (to reality).90 
Nonetheless, there remains in ideology, despite its double functioning as illusion and 
allusion, a gap between representation and reality. This, Althusser claims, allows for the 
possibility of further imaginary distortions. A particular ideology (as opposed to ideology as a 
concept, or the workings of ideology in general, as defined above)—usually the ideology of the 
ruling class, the class-specific ideology dominant in society—is able to be presented, through 
institutions supposedly neutral, invoking value judgments supposedly objective, as the universal 
ideology: the ideology of one and all. Thus ideology is, in a second and more direct sense, an 
illusion (i.e. not only a representation but a misrepresentation). This illusion, as mentioned 
above, at the same time constitutes an allusion. Being as the ‘real’ content of ideology are the 
material conditions of existence, which it is the ruling ideology’s function to reproduce, the 
effect is that, in the mechanism of an allusion that is but an illusion, subjects in society, despite 
their different class positions, consider it their ‘general’ interest that the established mode of 
production and the relations deriving from them be reproduced.91 
The same ideological mechanism is at work in the conception of profits offered by 
economics. The conception (profit) is a representation of a fundamental mechanism in the 
economy (excess). Presenting itself as an ‘objective’ science providing universally-valid 
explanations of phenomena in the capitalist economy while at the same time taking the point of 
view of the capitalist, economics, in a political move, is able to provide a misrepresentation of 
excess such that the capitalist class gets to claim, with the assent of non-capitalists, the excess as 
its own, as the profits that members of its class, the capitalist, has made. Being as the reaping of 
surplus is crucial to the workings of the capitalist political economy, at the same time the 
established capitalist social formation (and the material conditions therein) is, in being 
unquestioned and reinforced ideologically, reproduced. The economic claim on profits thus 
constitutes an ideological claim on surplus.  
For this reason, geographical economics, like mainstream economics in general, is of 
limited value. Even as it broaches the issue of excess, in the end it still covers it over by 
                                                
When these policies don’t work, “crisis is wielded [by Keynesian “socialism”] to put limits on the productive force 
of labor [where] destruction serves the self-conservation [if not further development or accumulation] of capital.” 
Negri, 194. These palliatives (in order to make the system more tolerable) contrast with the Marxist strategy of 
changing the structure of the system altogether. I discuss the Marxist attempt to deconstruct the notion of 
equilibrium more fully in chapter 3. 
90 See Althusser, esp. 107-124. 
91 See Althusser. 
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discussing savings and profits instead of surplus value. In order to fully reveal what this 
ideological claim does and the mechanisms of excess that are concealed, including the role of 
different individual elements, an alternative account must be found, one that confronts surplus 
value directly and positively. This is offered by Marx’s critique of political economy. 
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Chapter 3: The Fetishism of Exploitation 
Underlying economics’ assumption of equilibrium in the capitalist political economy, as 
explained in chapter 1, rather than the exchange of equal values by free individuals in a self-
regulating market, is the antithetical but necessary relationship between labor and capital, social 
forces embodied in the struggle between the classes. As Michael Ryan puts it in the epilogue to 
Negri’s Marx Beyond Marx, “what seems, in purely economic terms, an equilibrium is in fact a 
relation of antagonistic forces; what seems an objective structure is in fact the product of 
subjective activity. The economy is not a system of ‘objective’ laws operating independently of 
social agents. It is, rather, an antagonistic relation between subjects [i.e. between the capitalist 
class and the class of laborers].”92 
This (intensive) antagonistic political relation does, however, reach a quasi-stable state. 
The classes, like in a truce (or better yet, a stalemate), come to some determined and fixed 
‘agreement’ in which the relation between the two is (to use a term by Deleuze) stratified, 
gaining limits and characteristics (i.e. is territorialized and coded) with regards to certain things 
(e.g. the wage level, working conditions, etc., which always includes the acceptance of capitalist 
authority and direction, if not domination) up to a certain point.93 This stratification of the class 
relation/struggle is a particular state or status of the capitalist political economy (itself a 
historically specific social formation)—economics’ state of ‘equilibrium’—which Negri argues 
is a median or accident able to deflate and defer capitalist crisis (due to the displacement of 
capitalism’s contradictions).94 The most important constant in such states of ‘equilibrium,’ Negri 
points out, is surplus value or, more precisely, the relation between surplus value and wage, 
which is but the expression of the class relation that has been stratified. 
Surplus value, as explained in chapter 2, is posited by economics as profit, (ideologically) 
accounted for as savings on cost reaped through the political imposition of form on the economy 
by the State (which includes not only the government but also its territory and the economy it has 
unified) dominated by the capitalist class (posed as planners of the system). There is an 
important distinction, then, between surplus value and profit. Profit is surplus value as it is 
stratified in a quasi-stable state (economics’ equilibrium point, again not a point freely 
determined by equals but rather a temporary stalemate in the class struggle). As Negri puts it, 
profit is “generalized and socialized surplus value, [surplus value,] originally a category of 
production, [. . . that] has become a social category”95 as it is “detached from the conditions of its 
production and [made] capable of self-valorization.”96  
Separated from its production (which presumably is still apparent in the ‘identity’ of 
excess as surplus value), profit (the stratified or socialized form or ‘identity’ of excess) appears 
as what Negri calls a “social form, as form of the social relations.”97 As social form, profit 
                                                
92 Negri, 191. 
93 To put it briefly, Deleuze defines stratification as the delimiting or fixing of the quantity (into a ‘territory’ or 
habit) and quality (into a ‘code’ or function) of material as it occupies space and gains characteristics (e.g. the 
stratification of the political economy as the capitalist political economy encompassing a certain region of the world 
with characteristic forces performing certain functions). For more on stratification, see chapter 4. 
94 Reaching this (or some) equilibrium is the aim of the interventionism that economics, in the form of 
Keynesianism, sometimes resorts to, which Negri warns is the precursor and expression of the “planning State” in its 
three guises: planning, reformism, and command. See Negri, 192-197. For more on Keynesianism, see chapter 2 of 
this thesis, footnote 89. 
95 Negri, 85. 
96 Negri, 86. 
97 Negri, 86. 
 28 
appears natural and hence unchangeable, but the ‘natural’ result of the form that the social98 has 
taken (the social formation). Thus profit legitimates the stratified arrangement between the 
classes (the quasi-stable state, the point of ‘equilibrium’) (and the capitalist social formation 
itself), including to whom it accrues (the capitalists, the planners of the state of affairs). In 
“extend[ing] socially the contradiction of surplus value,”99 profit, Negri warns, “is the tendency 
towards the most aggressive and productive expansion [of capital].”100 
In focusing on and staying at the level of stratified profit (and savings), economics 
demonstrates the crux of Marx’s critique of it: the fact that it starts with the (actual) fact of 
capitalist phenomena (such as profit) without explaining how it (intensively) came to be and 
acknowledging that the social formation in which it is in (albeit dominant) is but one possible 
(i.e. not natural) arrangement of the social among many. In other words, following Marx (in what 
he says about Ricardo), we can say that mainstream modern economics shows that there are 
savings in costs, as, rightly, there are; it does not, however, explain where they come from.  
Marx’s critique of the political economy, in contrast, attempts to examine the forces 
underneath the stratified system (thereby asking the questions that economics does not). That is 
to say, not content with statements such as, “By virtue of larger scales of production, capitalists 
are able to save on costs,” Marx asks, “Where do these savings come from? From what (positive) 
source?” In order to do this, beyond the actuality of economic and political phenomena already 
stratified, Marx probes into the intensive processes that produce or lead to them. Specifically, he 
looks at the unique nature of the capitalist production process, looking at capitalism itself as an 
intensive social formation.101 Thus Marx, going beyond critique, develops an economic theory of 
surplus value much closer than economics proper to the political economy’s intensive processes. 
In a capitalist economic system, Marx explains, workers do not own the (most efficient) 
means of production, the ‘property’ of capitalists.102 As such, workers, in a process analogous to 
household members being employed by firms described in chapter 2, sell their labor—i.e. their 
abilities, skills, training, and energy in general (to do or produce something, i.e. to work)—to 
those who own the means of production, the capitalists. Just like with buying any other 
commodity, once paid for (with its exchange value), the buyer—in this context, the capitalist—
owns the commodity bought—labor, or, more specifically, (since commodities in general are 
valorized and labor power in particular is measured in time) labor time, the amount of time in 
which work is performed. Thus, as the worker becomes a laborer, work/labor, although coming 
from and performed by him, is alienated from the laborer, ceasing to be his. Labor becomes a 
commodity whose use value (its force and the work it performs) is owned by the capitalist, who, 
as owner, has the right to direct it and to its results.  
As part of the social economy and as personification of the other social force in it, the 
capitalist combines human labor with other productive forces (e.g. raw materials coming from 
nature; land, including the space in which activity takes place; other products of human labor 
such as technology, etc.) that he (supposedly) owns (as capital), leading to the transformation of 
material, producing goods demanded and circulating in the economy. Through this process, the 
                                                
98 For the sake of clarity, the social is the field (and its content) in which individual elements relate to each other or 
constitute social relations. 
99 Negri, 86. 
100 Negri, 91. 
101 I discuss in more depth the actual and the intensive in chapter 4, when I delve into the virtual assemblage of the 
historical social formation. 
102 This is due to the primitive accumulation I’ve touched upon in chapter 1, discussed in more depth in chapter 4. 
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economy is constituted as capitalist, with its interrelated and organized activities (production, 
distribution, exchange, consumption) that reproduce themselves and the different forms of value 
(labor value, exchange value, use value) that are the expressions of materials that go through 
them. These activities and values that give determination to the capitalist economy, as narrated in 
the previous paragraph, emanate from and are the result of the political relationship between 
labor and capital, forces that are themselves (through alienation) the result of the antagonistic 
relation between the classes and are, in turn, personified by the collective laborer and the 
collective capitalist.103 
In this capitalist political economy, human labor, Marx argues, is a unique factor of 
production, a unique productive force. For one, human labor is needed to work on all the other 
factors of production without which nothing will be produced (at least no use value demanded by 
the human political economy, the social formation in which human beings demand that their 
needs and wants be fulfilled). Even plucking fruit from a tree (or picking it from the ground, or 
consuming it), after all, requires human energy to do so. This is all the more true for more 
complex activities and demands in which human energies function as labor (as in a capitalist 
political economy where production and consumption are mediated). For another, as a direct 
consequence of this ‘natural’ state of affairs and, more importantly, as efflux of how human 
activity is organized in its capitalist state, labor is separated from all other productive forces and, 
in fact, set against them as they are designated or (through primitive accumulation104) 
appropriated as capital. 
The antagonistic relation constituted (through primitive accumulation) between labor and 
capital leads to further appropriations (that in turn lead to accumulation in general, i.e. further 
accumulations of capital), specifically the appropriation of surplus value, which reveals further 
the uniqueness of human labor as productive force. In the Grundrisse, Marx describes the 
process by which this happens: 
Within the production process itself, surplus value—the surplus value solicited as a result 
of the constraint of capital—appeared as surplus labour and even as living labour, which, 
however, since it cannot produce anything from nothing [since it does not own the means 
of production], finds its own objective conditions in advance. Now this surplus labour 
appears objectified as surplus product, and this surplus product, in order to valorize itself 
as capital, divides itself into a double form: as objective labour conditions (material and 
instrument) and as subjective labour conditions (food) for the living labour now to be put 
to work. The general form of value—objectified labor—and objectified labour arising 
from circulation is, naturally, the general and self-evident presupposition. Further: the 
surplus product in its totality—which objectifies surplus labour in its totality—now 
appears as surplus capital (as compared with the original capital, before it had undertaken 
this circulation), i.e. as autonomous exchange value, which is opposed to the living 
labour power as its specific use value. All the factors that were opposed to the living 
labour power as forces which were alien, external, and which consumed and utilized the 
                                                
103 There is a dialectical relation, then, between the forces and the classes (and the personifications). The nature of 
the relation between the classes alienates the forces from them, while classes and personifications in turn embody 
the forces, performing their function. 
104 Primitive accumulation, as adumbrated in chapter 1, is the appropriation of the means of production (other than 
labor) by/as capital. I provide a further elaboration in chapter 4. 
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living labour under definite conditions which were themselves independent of it, are now 
established as its own product and result.105 
 
There is, in other words, due to how the system is arranged (how activity is organized) in 
the capitalist political economy, over and above the appropriation of the (other) means of 
production (i.e. primitive accumulation), a redistribution of the productive force of labor itself.106 
Since during the production process the collective capitalist owns the labor time and the 
work/labor being performed therein—since, in effect, at work labor (in a further redistribution of 
the means of production) belongs to capital—the collective capitalist (in a redistribution of labor) 
owns as well the production results, the results of activity (organized/invested by capital) in 
which labor is the primary productive force. Everything that comes out of the production 
process, then, first and foremost belongs to the collective capitalist (or at least to the capitalist 
class as a whole).107  
In its appropriation of production results (due to the redistribution of productive forces, 
including labor), the collective capitalist does need to provide the collective laborer with 
something in exchange. The arrangement between the two is, after all, an exchange in which not 
only the collective capitalist but the collective laborer needs to be motivated to participate. The 
terms of the stratification of the political economy or of the truce between the two classes has to 
be agreed upon by both sides (although they do not exercise equal power). As described in 
chapter 1, capital is driven (on the M-C-M’ side) by its further accumulation. The collective 
laborer, on the other hand (on the C1-M-C2 side), is motivated by a remuneration that will allow 
him to buy a commodity other than (the products of) his own labor. The collective capitalist, in 
charge of the production process, provides this renumeration in the form of the wage. In the 
process, Marx argues, capital, itself needing to be motivated, creates a split, a gap, in labor, from 
which capital derives the resource for its accumulation, its own motivation. The value of this gap 
is what Marx calls surplus value. 
Thus for Marx, as he explains in the passage above, surplus value is really nothing but 
objectified labor. That is to say, surplus value, Marx argues, is nothing but the surplus labor 
produced by the collective laborer in a production cycle, that is then expropriated from the total 
value of labor and appropriated (like the other means of production) as (profit, which is then 
reinvested as) capital in a succeeding production cycle in which capital accumulates (more of) 
itself.108 In other words, since surplus value is the product of labor—which the collective 
capitalist, in the capitalist political economy, owns—the collective capitalist, at the end of a 
production cycle, claims surplus as his own—appropriates it as capital—which is then put back 
into the production process (reinvested) for the next production cycle under the assumption that 
                                                
105 Karl Marx, Grundrisse, in Karl Marx: Selected Writings, 2nd ed., ed. David McLellan (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), 400. 
106 This is analogous to Postone’s critique of traditional Marxism as he deconstructs the distinction between 
production and distribution. 
107 Hence activity in the political economy is truly capitalist. 
108 Of course not all capitalist enterprises succeed. Not all individual capitalist persons are able to make a profit that 
they can then reinvest as further (surplus) capital. There is, in other words, a risk involved in the process undertaken 
by capitalists. As explained in chapter 1, however, the mechanism that Marx describes attains when we consider, 
instead of individual persons, the capitalist class as a whole (hence the terms collective capitalist and collective 
laborer). Otherwise, it would no longer be a capitalist political economy, or, faced with a crisis of the capitalist class 
as a whole, the State resorts to Keynesian tactics, ensuring that the risk undertaken by its dominant class pays. See 
chapter 1 and (for more on Keynesianism) chapter 2, footnote 89. 
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it will lead to further appropriations of productive forces (especially labor), thereby accumulating 
more capital.  
Thus surplus value—surplus labor—that was produced by labor (referred to as living 
labor) confronts the laborer in the next production cycle as capital, as though it was produced by 
the collective capitalist, although in truth it is nothing but objectified labor, materialized labor, 
which now confronts the laborer as something different from him, alien labor. To reiterate 
Marx’s words, “The surplus product in its totality—which objectifies surplus labor in its 
totality—now appears as surplus capital (as compared with the original capital [. . .]), i.e. as 
autonomous exchange value, which is opposed to the living labor power as its specific use 
value.”109 All the other factors of production then that confront the collective laborer as 
something alien, as properties of the collective capitalist, are really nothing but the objectified 
surplus of living labor—of itself—from the previous production cycle, since they are its own 
products or (as in the case with raw materials from nature, land, etc.) it itself is the force needed 
to derive from them certain use values.  
Surplus value appropriated as profit, accumulated as capital, drives the capitalist class to 
organize and participate in the political economy (on the side of M-C-M’). Labor expropriated 
(by capital) of surplus value, on the other hand, is referred to as necessary labor, which, in the 
form of wage, is paid to the collective laborer, motivating a class of laborers to participate in the 
economy, working for capitalists (on the side of C1-M-C2). Living labor is necessary in two 
ways. First, the compensation for labor, which Marx points out is computed by Ricardo using the 
law of supply and demand, is merely that which is necessary for the collective laborer to 
‘maintain’ himself, so that he can continually reproduce labor. Wage, in other words, only 
accounts for ‘subjective’ necessity, which is merely “the means of subsistence of living labor” 
and not what it actually produces (which includes surplus value).110  
Secondly, the value attributed as having been produced by labor is merely the minimal 
value required to keep the production process going. As all surplus value generated in the 
process is attributed as surplus capital, the value of living labor is designated as the same value 
each time (each production cycle), which is but the value necessary to maintain the ‘objective’ 
conditions of the production process. Thus labor is rendered merely necessary in, as Marx says, a 
‘double form’: it is valued (recorded in the wage level) as merely the value necessary to maintain 
the collective laborer—so that he can keep coming to work, participating in the production 
process—in which his labor is considered to produce a constant value that but maintains the 
                                                
109 Marx, Grundrisse, 400. All emphases found in all the quotes are mine. All the different labor terms are Marx’s. 
Looking at Marx’s terminology, a basic duality emerges along the line of necessary labor or labor power and (the 
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“Constant capital” on the other hand is explained by Harvey “as labour power expended to replace the value 
equivalent of the means of production used up,” revealing that capital is itself (composed of) labor. Harvey, 45. 
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production whose quantity increase in proportion to the output to be produced (e.g. raw materials, machines) and 
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110 Marx, Grundrisse, 401. 
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production process (maintenance labor). Thereby labor is posited as producing only what is 
necessary without producing anything in excess of its current energy/productivity and of the 
current level of production in which it is employed.  
In The Limits to Capital, Harvey clarifies that necessary labor, or the cost of maintaining 
production (both the collective laborer and the production process)—roughly, the cost of 
production (since labor is the primary ‘cost’ that the collective capitalist compensates, thereby 
making production possible)—includes not only the wage per se but also various benefits and 
certain working and living conditions (in other words, social wage). The goal is not only to 
ensure the participation of labor in the production process but, more importantly, its reproduction 
(labor being, like capital, a fundamental force in the political economy). To be reproduced, 
laborers are provided a “commodity bundle” of use values “necessary to maintain and reproduce 
labouring individuals in their ‘normal state.’”111 This includes basic necessities (e.g. food, 
shelter, clothing) determined, like labor value itself, as a social average,112 thereby mediating the 
variation from person to person, taking into account not only the individual laborer but also those 
whom he has to support (e.g. the family). It does vary, however, according to the demands of the 
occupation (necessitating ‘education’) and the physical conditions under which it takes place 
(e.g. the exertion required, the climate).113 The goal, moreover, is to reproduce not only the 
present laborers but also their replacements (i.e. their children).114 That is to say, laborers as a 
class (performing the function of labor; from which labor is derived) need to be reproduced. 
Marx moreover clarifies that the definition of what is ‘necessary’ is conditioned by 
historical, moral, and/or cultural factors. In Wages, Price and Profit, Marx emphasizes how “the 
standard of living of labour [. . .] varie[s] greatly according to historical, geographical, and 
‘moral’ circumstances,” determining “needs as relative rather than absolute.”115 The historical 
and moral “conditions under which [. . .] the class of free labourers has been formed,” for 
example, as Harvey notes, determines what a particular group of such laborers belonging in a 
society consider as ‘needs’ (to maintain themselves) and what value they regard as adequate 
compensation to continue participating in the capitalist political economy (otherwise they may 
revert to other economic forms, such as previous ones).116 In Wage Labour and Capital, Marx 
elaborates that “our wants and pleasures have their origin in society; we therefore measure them 
in relation to society; we do not measure them in relation to the objects which serve for their 
gratification. Since they are of a social nature, they are of a relative nature.”117 That is to say, 
what ‘need’ consists in is not determined solely by the ‘standards’ set by the laborers themselves 
(which varies according to the particular group of laborers and the culture in which they belong). 
The laborers’ conception of need is affected by what goes by the name of ‘need’ in society in 
general, the social formation in which capitalists are also present, whose ‘needs’ may be (wanted 
to be) emulated by non-capitalists.118  
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117 Marx, Wage Labour and Capital, 33, cited in Harvey, 48. 
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What is considered a ‘necessity’ (by both laborers and capitalists) also changes through 
time, as society itself and expectations change. This is due in large part to the dynamics between 
labor and capital. As Harvey explains, “The value of labour power [. . . is] a perpetually moving 
datum point [. . .] defined [. . .] as the socially necessary remuneration of labour power [. . .] 
from the standpoint of the continued accumulation of capital.”119 As capital accumulates more 
and more value, even as most of it is reinvested, capitalists are able to spend more and more of 
that value (even though the ratio of what is spent to what is invested may stay the same) to fulfill 
their ‘needs.’ Laborers would not be left behind. As the ‘need quotient’ in society increases, so 
does the expectation of laborers, and the desired—‘needed’—social wage. Labor being 
fundamental to capital’s own accumulation, as the value of capital increases, so does the value of 
labor.120 
Despite the complex and social process by which the value of necessary labor is 
determined, however, Marx insists that necessary labor still does not include surplus labor, or 
that some surplus labor would always be separated from necessary labor, however ‘necessary’ is 
defined. In fact, by definition what is ‘necessary’ cannot include ‘surplus’ for then no further 
value would accumulate to capital, which is what drives the capitalist political economy. Thus 
the value attributed to necessary labor, Marx argues, always falls short of the full value that labor 
actually produces. In other words, when in fact labor = living labor + objectified labor, or what 
amounts to the same thing, labor = necessary labor + surplus labor or labor = what it produces, 
capital expropriates surplus value from labor such that labor = only necessary labor or labor = 
means of labor’s subsistence or labor = means of maintaining production, with all additional 
value (produced by and put into the production process) appropriated by and thought to originate 
from capital.  
In Capital, Marx explains the same mechanism from the perspective of exchange, where 
the forms of value express the expropriation of surplus labor and its appropriation as surplus 
capital in production. The basic argument is that actual work/labor (the force) is greater than the 
potential labor power (the commodity) that was (planned to be) used to produce it, at least since 
the potential of labor power is valued (by the collective capitalist) based not on its product (what 
it results into) but on its ‘needs’ (what maintains it). The exchange value attributed to labor 
(based on the potential of its labor power, which is abstract), in other words, is less than the use 
value that is derived from it by capital (the actual and concrete labor produced).121 Inversely, the 
actual work put in by the collective laborer (labor value), along with its product (labor power’s 
use value), has greater value than the wage (based on labor power’s exchange value) paid him by 
the collective capitalist.122  
The gap between labor and labor power, or between use value and exchange value (of 
labor power), is premised on the exchange between the collective capitalist and the collective 
laborer, which, as explained in chapter 1, is the basic exchange in which all other exchanges in 
the economy are based. Harvey explains that in exchange in general, “labour as a measure of 
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value,” i.e. (labor) value, “is the substance, and the immanent measure of value, but has itself no 
value.”123 Labor is the substance of value because, as Harvey notes, “the only attribute that all 
commodities have in common is that they are products of human labour.”124 As such, the amount 
of labor (e.g. work, energy, time) (labor value) expended that leads to the production of 
commodities (with their different use values) is the common measure by which commodities are 
exchanged in the market (with their exchange values). Labor, strictly speaking, has no value 
because it is the basis and measure of value itself: (labor) value. More precisely, labor has no 
fixed or determinable value because it is the (labor) value that is put into commodities that is the 
kernel or basis of all other values (e.g. exchange value, use value) that commodities, as they go 
through the different activities in the economy, acquire. 
In the particular exchange between the collective capitalist and the collective laborer, 
Harvey argues that labor, the substance of value that has no fixed value, is confused with “labour 
power, [. . .] a commodity traded on the market” with an exchange value.125 Labor power and 
labor are related but not the same. Labor power is the commodity from which labor (force, 
energy, work) is derived. That is to say, labor power is a commodity whose use value is the labor 
underlying it, extracted from it, or that it is capable of bringing about. Labor power is unique 
among commodities. It is, in Harvey’s words, “fundamental to the whole system of capitalist 
production [. . . even as it] is not produced directly under capitalist relations of production” but 
instead contains the force (labor) that makes production possible in the first place.126 Labor 
power is different from labor, however, in that labor power, like any other commodity, has (a 
fixable and determinable) value: its exchange value. Unlike other commodities (the commodities 
that are the products of the labor derived from labor power), however, the (exchange) value of 
labor power “is fixed by its costs of production.”127 That is to say, the (exchange) value of labor 
power is equal to its original labor value, the value of the labor (force, energy, work) necessary 
to be put into it, or, more precisely, the value or energy (labor) necessary to maintain the 
collective laborer who offers his labor power as a commodity. 
Thus labor power (the commodity), as it is exchanged for wage, is valued based on its 
cost of production. The exchange value of labor power, which is the value assigned to labor 
power as a commodity, is only the value needed to maintain it, necessary labor. In contrast, 
labor, the substance of all values (labor ‘value’) that has no fixed value, the force derived from 
labor power, in working (expending its force through time), does something, produces further 
commodities, whose use values (other commodities) are first and foremost (before they are sold) 
owned by the collective capitalist (as owner of the business, of the means of production other 
than labor). The use value of labor power (the fact that it expends labor, which leads to further 
use values), in effect, by virtue of the way that production is organized (by virtue of the 
arrangement between the collective laborer and the collective capitalist), belongs to the 
collective capitalist (to whom it accrues as capital).  
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127 The quote is from Harvey, although the full quote reads, “The value of labor power [. . .], like any other 
commodity, is fixed by its costs of production.” Harvey, 45, my emphasis. Due to the confusions that may arise 
from this, I opted to change the formulation to differentiate labor power from all other commodities. I explain more 
in one of the paragraphs that follow. 
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In actual fact, then, “what the labourer sells to the capitalist [in exchange for wage],” 
Harvey clarifies, “is not labour [. . .] but labour power—the capacity to realize in commodity 
form a certain quantity of socially necessary labour time.”128 That is to say, the collective 
laborer, in the exchange between him and the collective capitalist, is paid only the exchange 
value of labor power, which is only what is necessary to produce (and maintain) labor (or the 
collective laborer expending labor)—when the value that the collective capitalist appropriates is 
the use value that labor power brings about, labor (the work that it does and its product). In other 
words, while the exchange is really between labor power (potential or capability) and wage 
(what is necessary to maintain it), the collective capitalist exchanges wage (subsistence so as to 
be able to do work) for labor itself (actual work and its product).  
In this fundamental exchange between the collective laborer and the collective capitalist, 
labor reveals yet again what a unique productive force it is since what it produces (use value, 
labor) has greater value than what is necessary for it to produce (exchange value, labor power). 
That is to say, labor is unique because, in Marx’s account, some extra value—surplus value—is 
created or produced by labor (despite its dialectical relation with capital) because labor needs but 
a minimum ‘necessary’ value to produce, with which it then creates all sorts of values over and 
above that minimum. This, as explained above, is due to the fact that labor (the force) has more 
value than the labor power (its potential, its maintenance) of a laborer (the person).  
Containing or expending labor, the unique productive force that produces further 
commodities (that have more value than what is necessary for labor to be maintained), is labor 
power, a unique commodity. The further commodities that labor produces are none other than the 
commodities that are exchanged in the market, founded as these are, as explained above, on the 
basic exchange between labor (power) and wage. It would seem, then, that just as the collective 
capitalist (on the M-C-M’ side) derives from the commodity it buys (labor power) a use value 
greater than what he exchanges for it, the laborers (on the C1-M-C2 side) would get that surplus 
value back by deriving from the commodities (C2) that they buy a greater use value than C2’s 
exchange value (M). Unlike labor power, however, the exchange value of other commodities, 
while influenced (like labor power) by their cost of production (the labor value), are also, as 
economics’ supply and demand curve show, influenced by the use value derived from them by 
the consumer (the laborers). Its tie to its cost of production, its original (labor) value, thus 
differentiates labor power from all other commodities, whose values experience more 
fluctuations, if only because they are further away from the original (labor) value.129 
If anything, capitalists as sellers may actually raise the exchange value of the commodity 
that the collective laborer wants/needs (C2), setting it even further apart from the exchange value 
that the collective capitalist as buyer had to pay for the commodity that he needed (labor power), 
enabling him to extract even more surplus value—from the collective laborer. The collective 
capitalist (as seller) is able to do this to the collective laborer (as buyer) because the collective 
laborer is, in exchange in general, motivated by a change in quality (C1-M-C2). The collective 
laborer (as seller), in contrast, (except for certain demands on the social wage) cannot raise the 
exchange value of labor power (the only commodity that he sells) because the use value derived 
by the collective capitalist from the basic exchange (M-C-M’) is precisely the fact that the 
                                                
128 Harvey, 23. 
129 The value of labor power fluctuates, too, of course, as when, as discussed above, what is defined as ‘necessary’ 
changes. The fact that labor power’s value is tied to what is ‘necessary,’ however, indicates that, unlike other 
commodities, its value is in fact more or less fixed by its cost of production. 
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exchange value (labor power) is lower than the use value (labor) he can derive from it. This gap, 
after all, is what allows the collective capitalist to derive capital, i.e. what makes him a collective 
capitalist to begin with. As Harvey describes it, “The conditions of general commodity exchange 
make the capitalist form of circulation [characterized as it is by inequality] socially 
necessary.”130 The structural roles that the collective capitalist and the collective laborer occupy 
(opposite sides of M-C-M’ and C1-M-C2) thus necessarily attribute and distribute surplus value 
to capital.  
This (re)distributive mechanism is the direct effect of the arrangement of the economy in 
which the collective capitalist and the collective laborer are engaged in a political relationship 
characterized structurally by unequal power. The basic premise of the economic arrangement, as 
Harvey explains, is that “the labourer [upon working for the capitalist,] gives up rights to control 
over the process of production, to the product and to the [use] value incorporated in the product 
in return for the [exchange] value of labour power.”131 Unlike the collective capitalist, the 
collective laborer does not receive his “distributive share” of the value derived from the 
production process.132 Rather, he is paid merely the value that is necessary for him to maintain 
his labor power.  
The value (as expressed by its exchange value) necessary for labor to be maintained, even 
as it is conditioned by physiological and cultural factors (social wage), has, as Harvey points out, 
“nothing directly to do with the contribution of labour to the [use] value of the product.”133 Thus, 
no matter what value the collective laborer produces—which, labor being a unique productive 
force, is higher than what is necessary for it to produce—the collective laborer is given merely 
sufficient value—the necessary value—so that he can keep coming back to work, offering his 
labor power, using his labor, to produces (use) value that first and foremost belongs to the 
collective capitalist by virtue of the latter’s role as owner of the other means of production and 
planner of the productive enterprise.  
The uniqueness of labor as a productive force compounded by its structural role in the 
system is what, underneath the magical M-C-M’ schema, feeds the political economy. Upon 
payment to the collective laborer of the exchange value of labor power (= necessary labor = 
potential of labor power), the collective capitalist appropriates its use value, which includes the 
surplus value that labor produced (= necessary labor + surplus labor = actual labor produced). 
From this surplus value, capital emerges which, in repeating cycles, is then reinvested and—
thanks to labor’s continued production of surplus—accumulates more of itself (which, as 
explained in chapter 1, is what defines the capitalist political economy). The fact that the 
collective laborer occupies this role, that labor performs the function of enabling capital to derive 
from itself (more) surplus value (each time), makes labor a unique factor of production indeed. 
Hence Marx calls capital’s expropriation and appropriation of surplus value—which labor, by 
itself (despite its dialectical relation with capital), produced—the exploitation of labor, a 
phenomenon structurally ingrained in the capitalist system.134 
Exploitation is precisely what economics as a discourse, including geographical 
economics, covers over with all its talk of profit. By emphasizing savings, economics’ primary 
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the exploitation of labour power.” Harvey, 156. 
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goal (along with strategic planning and operations research) becomes the reduction of costs. 
While this is indeed desirable for the collective capitalist (whose point of view economics takes), 
it does not occur to economics that those costs aimed to be cut are the necessary value by which 
labor produces itself, on which the collective laborer lives. Thus by focusing on negative costs, 
the capitalist class, through economics, is able to enact its program of ever accumulating capital 
without having to bother with its source—labor—and its exploitation.  
This is why discourse on profit—rather than surplus value—is very important to 
economics. Profit is not only stratified surplus value: it is, as explained above, surplus value 
separated from its production or source (labor), which, by virtue of that separation, is 
legitimately redistributed—made desirable to be redistributed—to the dominant class, the 
capitalists, through exploitation 135 As Negri describes it, surplus value and profit are essentially 
the same thing—only that profit extends and legitimates the exploitation of surplus value in a 
‘social’ (or socially acceptable) form. In Negri’s words: 
Surplus value is the exploitation of living labor, the increase of its productivity, the 
exasperation of the intensity of labor, a total and totalizing drainage of working capacity; 
profit is the consolidation and fixation of surplus value, it is non-multiplying labor 
consolidated in a stable form, the theft of the productivity of labor, the indifference to 
living labor. But the distinction does not touch the nature of exploitation: both surplus 
value and profit are based on the subjugation of living labor—but in the case of surplus 
value living labor is considered within the production relation, while in the case of profit 
it is set against the conditions of production, to the totality of accumulation.136 
 
In Theories of Surplus Value, Marx examines Ricardo’s explanations of how savings on 
costs are reaped, which are the ways in which political economy does not talk about exploitation. 
Ricardo, Marx explains, assumes that the labor time needed to reproduce the collective laborer’s 
means of subsistence (the value of necessary labor) is equal to the full length of the working day. 
This is what Ricardo’s framework, the law of supply and demand, assumes as it takes the 
working day as constant. Necessary labor, however, Marx points out, is reproduced in but a part 
(not all) of the working day. The remainder of the day is thus, since the collective laborer 
continues working, spent on the production of surplus value.137 In other words, in failing to 
consider labor a unique force of production that produces more than what it needs to maintain 
itself (to produce), the working day is thought to produce only necessary value. The concept of 
surplus value is thus foreclosed, replaced by savings and profit. 
Ricardo moreover, Marx notes, looks only at capital. As such, all that becomes apparent 
in Ricardo’s approach is the rate of surplus value, which depends on the proportion of the length 
of the working day to necessary labor time, an amount discernable through the composition of 
                                                
135 Note that exploitation does not produce surplus value strictly speaking, but rather redistributes it from labor to 
capital. That redistribution, however, (since the ‘identity’ of the different activities deconstruct themselves, as 
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136 Negri, 90. 
137 Marx, Surplus Value, 440. 
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capital. Surplus value itself, however, is not discerned, because it can only be gleaned by also 
looking at labor composition.138 Political economy makes a crucial mistake when, by merely 
looking at commodities already produced, it considers labor composition as constant (thereby 
invisible in its equations) and bases its analysis solely on capital. This, Marx explains, leads 
economics to the conclusion that relative surplus value (due to increased productivity, as with 
improvements in technology) is the same as absolute surplus value (due to the lengthening of the 
working day).139  
Because of this focus on capital, whose point of view it takes, political economy then 
attributes all extra value produced in the system, if it detects any (separate from savings on 
costs), to increases in productivity, which merely increase the rate of surplus value and not 
surplus value itself. This increased rate, then, which leads to savings, is attributed to the strategic 
planning of capitalists competing with each other within the same class. Thus political economy 
misses, along with surplus value itself, surplus value’s true source, labor, the truly unique 
productive force derived from the other class, the class of laborers. Capital of course, as 
explained above, exploits whatever surplus value is produced in the system, in which, in this act, 
lies capital’s uniqueness. That is to say, capital, unlike labor, is unique not primarily as a 
productive force but as a primarily redistributive one. This redistribution then allows capital to 
further production, which allows it, like labor (and the other means of production that, via 
primitive accumulation, it has appropriated) to finally become a productive force, and 
increasingly (because of its continued accumulation of surplus value) the dominant one.  
In taking the point of view of capital and taking its phenomena as given, Marx further 
argues that political economy misses yet other ways in which surplus value is produced (since, in 
the first place, it does not discern it). Even if the working day is shortened, for example, it cannot 
necessarily be said that surplus value is not produced, that there is no surplus value. This is 
because, Marx points out, aside from increased productivity (which increase the rate of surplus 
value, producing relative surplus value), surplus value can also be increased by manipulating 
labor composition, i.e. by hiring more laborers.140 More labor power brings about more labor, 
which correspondingly produces more surplus value (even as the working day has become 
shorter).141 This is what can be called the external expansion of capitalism (as opposed to the 
internal expansion of absolute and relative surplus values). 
Even as political economy’s official discourse already makes it difficult to discern 
surplus value (and thereby its production and exploitation), it is not the only thing that conceals 
it. A phenomenon that fetishizes exploitation as an independent, natural mechanism (beyond 
human control; therefore discourse about it amounts to nothing) is built into the system. Labor, 
as mentioned above, is the substance of value. As such, labor undergoes a process of abstraction 
by which it is separated from its qualities, i.e. from the concrete work that it performs (which is 
of many different kinds) and the particular characteristics it takes on (according to what work, as 
a force, it is employed). This process, Harvey explains, enables labor to become the measure of 
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value, the common standard by which the value of commodities is measured, at least “to the 
degree that [. . .] wage labour becomes general”142  
For it to “regulate commodity production and exchange,” however, labor (made abstract) 
has to be “represented materially” in what is after all an economy of material commodities (or at 
least of commodities tied to some material).143 Abstract labor, the measure of value, is therefore 
itself represented by an equally abstract albeit material form: the money form. In a phenomenon 
that Marx calls the fetishism of commodity, this leads to the domination of social relations in the 
political economy by the cash or money nexus. Social relations in the capitalist political 
economy, Marx narrates, increasingly become the relation between commodities (things) since 
they have values related and comparable to each other, and since human beings themselves (both 
laborers and capitalists) relate to each other by virtue of commodities, those which they produce, 
consume, and provide each other, with their specific values. Hence, as Marx describes it, social 
relations in capitalism become “material relations between persons and social relations between 
things.”144  
The relation between commodities that seem independent of their human producers are 
moreover expressed or measured in terms of money, itself a material commodity, albeit an 
abstract one. While money does imply the value behind it, however, Harvey notes that, by virtue 
of its very representation, money covers over the substance of the value represented, i.e. labor. 
Labor, like money, is indeed abstract, but it is nonetheless directly related to actual and concrete 
labor (the concrete work that the force performs). Thereby labor still shows the social meaning of 
value and the social relations between human beings it implies. Money, as abstract material 
representation, in its very representing, conceals what is represented (labor), along with its 
implications (e.g. its social and productive nature). Thus, as Harvey puts it, “the existence of 
money—the form of value—conceals the social meaning of value itself.”145 Money becomes 
fetishized, becoming independent from and determinant of human relations. In fact, due to its 
key role as a commodity, it becomes perhaps the most fetishized of commodities. As Marx says, 
“the riddle presented by money is but the riddle presented by commodities . . . in its most glaring 
form.”146 
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Aside from its key role in facilitating the exchange of commodities, money is a unique 
commodity in terms of the forms of value that it acquires. As explained in chapter 1, money, like 
any other commodity, has a labor value (the labor power that went into printing money) and a 
use value (the costs saved as money facilitates the circulation of commodities). Unlike other 
commodities, however, money, in playing the dual role of standard of exchange and common 
measure, has two exchange values: (like other commodities) what one is willing to exchange for 
it (provided one doesn’t know what denomination it is), which is determined by its conditions of 
production (its labor value) and its use (as facilitator of exchange); and (since money has a value 
marked on it, its denomination) what it is worth as the measure of value (its designated exchange 
value, as it were, unconnected to its labor and use values). Thus money, as Harvey describes it, 
“acquires a dual exchange value—that dictated by its own conditions of production (its 
‘inherent’ exchange value), and that dictated by what it will buy (its ‘reflex’ value),” which is 
purely determined by exchange.147 
This duplicitous nature of the exchange value of money (itself a commodity) allows—and 
conceals—the gap between labor power’s exchange value and its use value, labor. That is to say, 
the gap between labor power and labor is temporarily resolved—displaced—in money, having as 
it does a dual exchange value. Money prepares the way for this as it separates labor (the 
substance of value) from material (that contains value), including labor’s own product, as it 
functions as the representation of value. Having two exchange values, money is then able to 
present the exchange between (labor) value or wage (the value of necessary labor) on one side 
(as its inherent exchange value) and the material that labor produced (that includes surplus value) 
on the other (as its reflex exchange value) as an equal exchange. Seeing as money, as explained 
above, is the dominant and ‘natural’ relation in the political economy, such equalization of 
unequal values appears commonplace: natural. Thus exploitation is concealed. 
Marx’s critique of political economy aims precisely against this fetishism. By looking at 
it from the outside, Marx gained sight of the capitalist social formation as a set of intensive 
economic processes expressed by dialectical forms of value determined by the political relation 
between the classes that has stratified into a historical form. As such, in Marx’s approach, 
phenomena are not accepted as natural but are examined in terms of the intensive processes that 
give rise to them. Marx’s comprehensive view moreover takes into account the experience of all 
human beings in the political economy, at least in terms of the structural position of the class in 
which they belong. Marx’s critique is thus not ideological in the way that economics is, which 
assumes the system as natural as it looks at it from the point of view of the capitalist. 
There is a sense, however, in which Marx’s approach is also ideological. Once one finds 
the position in the system that his class occupies (whether it performs the function of labor or 
capital), that person can take the stance of that class, defend it, and perform its work. Marx does 
not deny this. In fact, this is precisely the way in which Marxist Antonio Gramsci describes what 
he calls the philosophy of praxis. Marxism to Gramsci is not exempt from ideology. Rather, 
Marxism is itself an ideology. Marxism does, however, occupy a privileged position among 
ideologies since, as Gramsci clarifies, “the philosophy of praxis [. . . as theory of contradictions] 
is the terrain on which determinate social groups become conscious of their own social being, 
their own strength, their own tasks, their own becoming.”148 In other words, Marxist ideology, by 
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virtue of its critical approach, is the ideology that, by locating the position of the classes in the 
system and the forces with which they are involved, enables persons to assume, rather than the 
ideology of some other class, their own ideology. Marx(ism) offers, as it were, an ‘objective’ or 
at least more comprehensive view of the historical formation (with its structural positions) before 
the taking on of ideology. 
Marx did have an ideological allegiance to a class, however. Perhaps this is why there 
seems to be something lacking in his account, specifically on the key concept of surplus value. 
Marx describes elaborately (and repeatedly) the exploitation of surplus value, which, it must be 
noted, is but its redistribution. Its production, on the other hand, is left to a vague conclusion to 
be made from the fact that labor is a unique productive force, that labor produces more value 
than the value it needs to maintain itself and, thereby, produce. This is compounded by the fact 
that labor is a political term, seeming to be possessed only by some persons (laborers) and not 
others (capitalists), who act instead like vampires. What does Marx mean by labor exactly, and 
what happens with it such that it produces more value than what it needs to produce, i.e. such 
that it produces surplus value? To gain more insight into this, the historical actualizations (of 
labor, of surplus value) have to be probed at an abstract, more general level. In addition, then, to 
economics’ actual facts and the intensive processes that Marx gleans underneath, there is a need 
to look further: at virtual ‘Ideas’—‘abstract machines’—that Deleuzian metaphysics provides.  
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Chapter 4: Work in the Assemblage 
It would seem that Deleuze149, in the two volumes of Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 
provides a straightforward Marxist account of the mechanism that Marx refers to as exploitation. 
Eugene Holland, illustrating the connection between Marx and Deleuze in an introduction to 
Anti-Oedipus, explains that, for both, the market (exchange) value of labor power (the 
commodified value of the human being, the laborer) is: 
Equal to the value of the commodities required to produce it. Yet its market value [. . .] is 
always less than the value [i.e. labor] that labor power contributes to production. Thus 
surplus-value arises from employing labor power in commodity-production: whatever 
values may get assigned to non-commodity factors of production, surplus-value is 
appropriated as the difference between the market value of the goods labor power 
produces as output and the market value of the goods required to reproduce it as an 
input.150  
 
Deleuze calls surplus value in the capitalist political economy the surplus value of flow, 
which “arises as the quantitative differential between the flow of money invested in factors of 
production [. . .]—labor, materials, technology (and marketing)—and the flow of money 
returning at the end of the production-consumption cycle.”151 This differential allows for “the 
fundamental mechanism of capital, axiomatization: [the] conjoining [of] deterritorialized 
resources [i.e. the transformation of varied activities into comparable abstract labor] and [the] 
appropriat[ion of] the surplus arising from their reterritorializing conjunction [as when the 
expropriated surplus labor is appropriated as surplus capital].”152 
In “Apparatus of Capture” from A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze, like Marx in Capital, 
explains the same mechanism, but differently. Deleuze cites Bernard Schmitt in explaining that 
the nominal wage that the worker receives has a purchasing power equivalent merely to real 
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wage. An “undivided flow” (the stock), Deleuze elaborates, is divided and distributed, but only a 
portion of it (the “comparative set”) is “converted” (and thereby consumed) by the laborers, with 
an “income siphoned off.”153 As such, “real wages are only a portion of nominal wages; 
similarly, ‘useful’ labor is only a portion of labor.”154 Deleuze calls the axiomatization of “this 
difference or excess constitutive of profit, surplus labor, or the surplus product”—what Marx 
refers to as exploitation—capture.155  
More precisely, capture is the mechanism in which the value of surplus labor, through 
direct comparison, is expropriated and, in monopolistic fashion, appropriated—‘captured’—by 
capital (in that process constituting ‘surplus value’), a process that takes place as the social 
formation gains what Deleuze calls a “unity of composition,” a determined and organized form 
of working (an ‘adaptive consistency’).156 This is the way in which, in Deleuze’s words, “the 
mechanism of capture contributes from the outset to the constitution of the aggregate upon which 
the capture is effectuated.”157 Appropriating labor as it does in a process in which it subordinates 
its source (labor) for its own ends, capital—nothing but surplus labor—is thus, to use Deleuze’s 
term, an apparatus of capture.158 
Thus Deleuze, echoing Marx, concludes: 
Labor and surplus labor are strictly the same thing; the first term is applied to the 
quantitative comparison of activities, the second to the monopolistic appropriation of 
labor by the [collective capitalist. . . .] There is no labor that is not predicated on surplus 
labor. Surplus labor is not that which exceeds labor; on the contrary, labor is that which is 
subtracted from surplus labor and presupposes it.159  
 
Like Marx, Deleuze is moreover not convinced with the explanations that economics 
gives of excess. Rather, these explanations (the shortening of the working day, improvements in 
technology, etc.), Deleuze points out, merely refer to the displacement by capitalism of “any 
apparent limits to its growth by adding new axioms to its systems of axiomatization.”160 Holland 
provides examples, reminiscent of Marx’s own refutation of Ricardo. 
When biological and/or political limits appear as obstacles to the extraction of “absolute” 
surplus-value—a form of surplus-value derived from the brute suppression of wages 
and/or the lengthening of the working day—capital adds axioms of technology to 
increase productivity within the system of production so that more value (in the form 
called “relative” surplus-value) can be extracted from the same working day at the same 
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wage-rate. Similarly, when extraction of surplus-value reduces buying-power to the point 
of threatening a crisis of over-production, axioms of marketing and advertising are added 
to bolster or fabricate consumer demand. The extension of capitalist axiomatics to global 
scale, finally, both renews the extraction of absolute surplus-value in some places, and 
provides additional markets for the redistribution and reappropriation of relative surplus-
value, in others.161 
 
There is, however, as I point out at the end of chapter 3, something missing in the account 
of excess as capture by capital, as exploitation. Exploitation is first and foremost a phenomenon 
of (re)distribution, as what is labor is valorized or captured as capital. It is true, as Harvey notes, 
that for Marx distribution and production are dialectically related. That is to say, by distribution 
and production, as explained in chapter 1, Marx means the same activity, albeit in different 
forms. In this way Marx is able to show that distribution determines the shape of (further) 
production and that the means of production are to begin with (through primitive accumulation) 
distributed. There is thus some validity in Marx’s claim that excess derives from exploitation. 
After all, as the surplus labor redistributed at the end of a production cycle is put into further 
production (under the banner of capital), the (re)distributive phenomenon of exploitation 
determines the shape of that further production (e.g. as one driven by capital, with labor 
subordinated to capital), in which exploitation is not only repeated, but, every time it does so, the 
surplus value exploited is compounded or accumulated, increasing in value. There is, in other 
words, a sense in which, as Marx reveals, (re)distributive exploitation produces excess.162 
There is also a sense, however, in which production coming from (re)distribution is 
secondary. Marx himself explains that for exploitation to take place, labor has to perform its 
unique power: produce more value than what it needs to produce. Exploitation then presupposes 
a mechanism that generates excess, a mechanism presupposed by the entrance of this excess into 
the particular (stratification of the) ‘agreement’ between the collective laborer and the collective 
capitalist in which surplus value is exploited. In other words, there is a generation of excess that 
is presupposed by its actualization (as surplus value) in the historical formation of the political 
economy as capitalist. To gain insight on excess in capitalism, this metaphysical generation, in 
addition to its historical actualization or production, has to be examined. While exploitation or 
capitalist capture (which leads to the production of further excess) is historical, this generation, I 
argue, is metaphysical—or in Deleuze’s terms, virtual—in that it is not specific to and goes 
beyond any particular historical formation. It is this virtual generation that this chapter seeks to 
probe into by looking at Deleuze’s extension of Marx’s concept of primitive accumulation. 
Marx provides clues as to how ‘virtual’ excess is generated when he speculates about 
how capitalism originates. Coining the term primitive accumulation, in Capital Marx describes 
the ‘first’ accumulation that permitted an element—capital—to distinguish itself from another—
labor—which it then exploits so as to ever increase itself. Primitive accumulation, in effect, is the 
posited origin of all succeeding capital accumulations. Just as the succeeding accumulations have 
as their reference point surplus value, insight into virtual excess can be gleaned from primitive 
accumulation. 
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Marx posits primitive accumulation from the ‘vicious circle’ of capitalist productive 
activity. Clearly, Marx explains, “the accumulation of capital presupposes surplus value; surplus 
value presupposes capitalistic production; capitalistic production presupposes the pre-existence 
of considerable masses of capital and of labour power in the hands of producers of 
commodities,” which in turn presupposes a preceding accumulation of capital in the hands of 
certain producers . . .163 Thereby some primitive accumulation of capital in a few hands, Marx 
infers, originated the capitalist political economy.  
Far from political economy’s portrayal of this originary process as the idyllic 
arrangement that came about between “the diligent, intelligent, and, above all, frugal elite [. . . 
and] the other, lazy rascals, spending their substance, and more, in riotous living,” Marx asserts 
that “in actual history it is notorious that conquest, enslavement, robbery, murder, briefly force, 
play the great part.”164 More specifically, Marx points out that “money and commodities are no 
more capital than are the means of production and of subsistence,”165 including labor power, save 
for that process in which money and commodities (or certain of them) are transformed into 
capital as they are related to certain means of production that are designated as capitalist 
property. This moment of transformation (which, historically speaking, came out of the old 
feudal and agricultural system) is what Marx posits as capitalism’s origin, capital’s primitive 
accumulation. Marx describes the circumstances in which it takes place: 
Two very different kinds of commodity-possessors [. . .] come face to face and into 
contact; on the one hand, the owners of money, means of production, means of 
subsistence, who are eager to increase the sum of values they possess, by buying other 
people’s labour power; on the other hand, free labourers, the sellers of their own labour 
power, and therefore the sellers of labour. [. . .] The capitalist system presupposes the 
complete separation of the labourers from all property in the means by which they can 
realize their labour. As soon as capitalist production is once on its own legs, it not only 
maintains this separation, but reproduces it on a continually extending scale. The process, 
therefore, that clears the way for the capitalist system, can be none other than the process 
which takes away [i.e. expropriates] from the labourer the possession of his means of 
production; a process that transforms, on the one hand, the social means of subsistence 
and of production into capital, on the other, the immediate producers into wage-labourers. 
The so-called primitive accumulation, therefore, is nothing else than the historical 
process of divorcing the producers from the means of production. It appears as primitive, 
because it forms the pre-historic stage of capital and of the mode of production 
corresponding with it.166 
 
Marx specifies that free labourers are free “in the double sense that neither they 
themselves form part and parcel of the means of production, as in the case of slaves, bondsmen, 
etc., nor do the means of production belong to them, as in the case of peasant-proprietors; they 
are, therefore, free from, unencumbered by, any means of production of their own.”167 
Historically speaking, this freedom was brought about by the then-revolutionary bourgeois class 
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that freed all men168 from old feudal ties and even the “regime of the guilds.”169 These ‘free’ 
labourers then, under the social formation that the increasingly dominant bourgeois class put in 
place (capitalism), “become sellers of themselves,” of their labor power.170  
The selling of one’s labor power, however, Marx notes, requires that a further condition 
be met, namely, that so-called ‘free’ laborers be “robbed of all their own means of production” 
save for their own labor power.171 This is precisely what the bourgeois—becoming capitalists—
were able to do in the process of primitive accumulation as non-labor means of production 
become capital’s property (tied to money, itself a commodity, invested in production).172 Thus, 
Marx assesses, “the starting-point of the development that gave rise to the wage-labourer as well 
as to the capitalist was the servitude of the labourer, [. . . an] advance that consisted in a change 
of form of this servitude, in the transformation of feudal exploitation into capitalist 
exploitation.”173 
As indicated by its name, primitive accumulation appears ‘primitive,’ seeming to be 
historical. There is no reason to suppose, however, that this is a unique happening in history. To 
explain it in Deleuzian terms, while the shift from the feudal to the capitalist social formation 
was indeed the reaching of a threshold—after which things would never again be the same—and 
in that sense the process is indeed a historical event (in being incontrovertible), there is no reason 
to suppose that there is an exact date in which the transformation began or was completed or that 
it took place at only one moment (as a unique historical moment). Thus the move by which Marx 
posits primitive accumulation is less the placing in history of an empirical fact than a logical 
hypothesis based on how capitalism works (primarily the fact of accumulation). Admittedly, as a 
presupposition, it has to take place (be posited) at capitalism’s origin, but it nonetheless does not 
need to precede capitalism but only needs to be assumed so that capital can do its work (of 
exploitation and accumulation).  
This is the way in which Harvey defines primitive accumulation, namely, as the increase 
or expansion (as opposed to the formation) of the proletariat, which takes place not only at the 
moment of capitalism’s formation, but is coexistent with it, continuing and perhaps becoming 
more intense the more that capitalism matures.174 Analogous to the external expansions of 
capitalism that Deleuze talks about, Harvey explains this increase happening “in many guises” as 
capitalism transforms “pre-capitalist and intermediate social formations” (including those 
historically co-existent with it, separated by geography) into its own image (or, more precisely, 
according to its axioms).175 Following Marx, Harvey goes so far as to say that capitalism, 
through competition, cannibalizes itself as it turns capitalists against each other, forcing the 
proletarianization of its own kind (as capitalists that can’t keep up are demoted to the position of 
wage laborers).176 
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If values are redistributed in accumulation in general (through the mechanism of 
exploitation laid out in chapter 3), then perhaps the highest rate in which values are redistributed 
can be found in primitive accumulation. After all, this is the time that a worker (in general) 
becomes a (wage) laborer, in which the surplus value he produces for the first time177 is 
appropriated by the collective capitalist. Since, theoretically speaking, prior to primitive 
accumulation there is no exploited value to speak of, the increase in capital (its accumulation), 
once primitive accumulation does set it, is especially notable (in its primitiveness, as it were). 
Moreover, since at this first instance expectations are low, i.e. what is considered necessary is at 
its most rudimentary, more surplus value per laborer can be expropriated, allowing for high 
increases in capital. Lastly, capital, as Harvey notes, can perform ongoing primitive 
accumulation by expanding to its outside, by subordinating other political economies to its 
axioms. When it does, capital, already exploiting surplus value where it is lodged, is able to turn 
yet other workers, workers initially beyond its grip, into capitalist laborers, thereby increasing 
the value that it exploits in absolute terms. 
The magnitude of the surplus value exploited in primitive accumulation becomes even 
more stark when it is realized that, whenever it happens, it is not only human labor that is 
subordinated to capital, but first and foremost non-labor (non-human) means of production, i.e. 
natural resources (e.g. wood from trees, energy from the sun, land or space in which production 
takes place, etc.) that are used as raw materials for human activity, the materials that labor, in 
capitalist production, works on. These are the means of production that the collective laborer 
does not own, the reason why he becomes a laborer to capital in the first place. These means of 
production, it must be noted, also have and produce value—values out there in the world, values 
of ‘nature,’ as it were—that capital first (perhaps most easily) appropriates, enabling it, in 
gaining (more) value, to subordinate labor.178 
Thus nature’s value, as it were, is the first—primitive—value that capital exploits, 
making capital emerge in the first place. Through money (a capitalist commodity), the collective 
capitalist claims an exclusive right to these non-labor means of production, resources derived 
from nature, as capitalist property, thereby (like surplus labor later on) appropriating them as 
capital.179 This is the way in which money (the commodity of exchange) and property (non-labor 
means of production) are the two forms that capital takes, forming a mirror image, as it were: 
capital as money is invested to use material as capitalist property that, through exchange, leads to 
more capital (as money). In appropriating not only human labor but nature itself, there is a very 
real sense in which capital (an imperial element) owns the world. 
Despite certain emphases, then, for Marx exploitation is not just the exploitation of 
human labor. In the concept of primitive accumulation, Marx gestures towards a more 
comprehensive account of surplus value, even though only implicit and incomplete.180 That is to 
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say, for Marx human labor is not the only source of (surplus) value.181 Marx does, however, for 
political (and ideological) reasons, expressly focus on accumulation in general so as to put in 
dramatic light the striking phenomenon there: the exploitation of labor. He does this, in line with 
praxis, so as to bring critique to a revolution.182 Marx did not, however, by assuming that the 
exploitation of nature is given, mean to say that, unlike the exploitation of labor, that of nature is 
natural (and thereby acceptable). On the contrary, by positing it in primitive accumulation, Marx 
is able to theorize nature’s exploitation (at least in the form where surplus value is derived from 
it and appropriated as capital) as specific to the capitalist political economy. As such, it is 
something that can (and will) be changed as the condition of labor itself is revolutionized. 
Even though more comprehensive in including value derived from both human labor and 
nature, the account of excess provided by primitive accumulation is still primarily 
(re)distributive. While through the (re)distribution of value surplus value is indeed produced and 
compounded, it still does not explain the gap between what is necessary to produce and what is 
produced—the gap that makes possible (the exploitation of) surplus value in the first place. 
Perhaps, then, following Marx, an even more comprehensive view can be developed. This is 
what Deleuze attempts to do in A Thousand Plateaus when he points out the need to “enlarge 
upon” Marx’s concept of primitive accumulation.183 As Deleuze remarks in “Apparatus of 
Capture,” “The fact remains that there is a primitive accumulation that, far from deriving from 
the agricultural mode of production [from which capitalism supposedly derived what was 
primitively accumulated], precedes it.”184 “As a general rule,” Deleuze continues, “there is 
primitive accumulation whenever an apparatus of capture is mounted, with that very particular 
kind of violence that creates or contributes to the creation of that which it is directed against, and 
thus presupposes itself.”185  
While capital, as mentioned above, is indeed an apparatus of capture (one historical 
actualization of it), the apparatus of capture itself is metaphysical. That is to say, the apparatus of 
capture, to use Deleuze’s terminology, is an ‘abstract machine’ or an ‘Idea’ in the virtual that is 
the underlying condition, structure, or ‘plan’ of intensive processes that produce actual things in 
dynamics of difference.186 Capital is, through intensive processes, a particular actualization of an 
abstract machine (the apparatus of capture). The apparatus of capture, however, even as it is 
actualized in different historical forms (like capital), is not reducible to them or to any particular 
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one, since it is their underpinning, the conditioning abstract phenomena or processes that are at 
work in general, actualized in many different particularities, beyond the confines of any 
particular historical formation. The abstract machine (apparatus of capture), in other words, 
characterizes, conditions, and/or gives some determination to specific historical forms or 
actualizations (capital) as their metaphysical underpinning. Even as there is a relation of 
conditioning, however, the relation of the abstract to the concrete, of the virtual to the actual, is 
one of difference;187 hence actualization is not imitation or exemplification (of a perfect model) 
but, true to the term, the actualization of potentials, of the virtual. 
By relating primitive accumulation to something more abstract and general, what Marx 
posits as the historical origin of capitalism is not just generalized (as in Harvey) but 
philosophized by Deleuze in an abstract, virtual level. This way, Deleuze is able to discern the 
metaphysical underpinning of the historical production (i.e. exploitation) of surplus value in 
capitalism, making it possible to probe how, at that metaphysical or virtual level, excess is 
generated. Excess, after all, is not historically specific to capitalism, even though its form of 
capture (exploitation) is. The abstract mechanisms uncovered will then give insight to what 
historically happens to the gap between what is necessary to produce and what is produced, 
which makes possible (the exploitation of) actual surplus value. 
Marx himself hints at such abstract mechanisms. In Theories of Surplus Value, he 
explains that surplus value “can only exist when the productivity of social labor is sufficiently 
developed to make possible some sort of excess of the total working-day over the labor time 
required for the reproduction of wage.”188 Deleuze echoes this when he says that “it is by virtue 
of the stock that activities of the ‘free action’ type come to be compared, linked, and 
subordinated to a common and homogeneous quantity called labor,” which then (since labor has 
an exchange value lower than what it produces) allows capital’s appropriation of surplus 
value.189 What Deleuze is explaining as stockpiling in A Thousand Plateaus is what Marx calls 
primitive accumulation in Capital. The important point that both make is that the virtual 
generation of excess—primitive accumulation, stockpiling—is presupposed by the 
(trans)formation of the political economy in which (as a mark of its ‘sufficient’ development, as 
Marx describes it), through capture (i.e. exploitation), that excess is produced (and 
compounded)—i.e. actualized.190 
Deleuze posits primitive accumulation (or stockpiling) by describing what happens to 
what he calls the primitive society, an other (ontological) form of society (or structuration of 
space) beside(s) the town and the state.191 The primitive society, according to Deleuze, cannot be 
said to exist before the city forms (since to begin with these forms are not historical). Rather, 
“these processes [of structuring space],” Deleuze demonstrates, “are variables of coexistence that 
are the object of a social topology, [hence] the various corresponding formations are 
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coexistent.”192 Primitive societies, in other words, coexist (virtually) with the town and the state, 
along with the State into which they are incorporated. The primitive society, however, does all 
that it can to prevent the State from being formed. As Deleuze describes it, 
[Primitive societies] prevent the potential central points from crystallizing, from taking 
on consistency, [. . . by use of] those mechanisms that keep the formations of power both 
from resonating together in a higher point [which would transform it into a state] and 
from becoming polarized at a common point [which would make it a town]: the circles 
are not concentric, and the two segments require a third segment through which to 
communicate, [a third segment that primitive societies lack and block to prevent from 
being incorporated into a State].193 
 
In other words, primitive societies “are not societies without a State, in the sense that they failed 
to reach a certain stage, but are counter-State societies organizing mechanisms that ward off the 
State-form, which makes its crystallization impossible.”194  
As Deleuze points out, however, “to ward off is also to anticipate.”195 Thus, “primitive 
societies warded off both thresholds [of the town and the state, which are inevitably incorporated 
into the State] while at the same time anticipating them.”196 In other words, “primitive societies 
cannot ward off the formation of an empire or State without anticipating it, and they cannot 
anticipate it without its already being there, forming part of their horizon.” 197 Ultimately, 
however, the primitive society is captured by the State, although it does retain “mechanisms of 
prevention-anticipation”198 since “States cannot effect a capture unless what it captures coexists, 
resists in primitive societies, or escapes under new forms.”199 Thus the primitive society, just like 
the town and the state (that it wards off), is incorporated—primitively accumulated—into the 
State (which it thus always anticipates), although, as a counter-tendency, it coexists (outside). 
A historical actualization of the (primitive) accumulation of the primitive society into the 
State is the mechanism delineated by geographical economics wherein households are 
incorporated into the factory city. Once incorporated in the factory city, households stop 
producing by themselves and are instead employed in the factory, unified in a larger productive 
whole even while remaining distinct (as labor). Just as the (virtual) primitive society is captured 
by the State, so is (historical) labor captured by capital. Historical labor, then, has its origin in 
something similar to the productive activities of the virtual primitive society (before it is 
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incorporated in the State). Thus the nature of these virtual productive activities and their capture 
will shed light into how excess originates. 
Deleuze describes what happens whenever productive activities are captured when he 
says, “Diffusion occurs.”200 This diffusion, Deleuze clarifies, even as the State plays the role of 
central authority, does not “assume a center [e.g. the State, or the factory] at which the diffusion 
would begin.”201 The diffusion, Deleuze explains,  
Does not proceed from an imperial center that imposes itself upon and homogenizes an 
exterior milieu; neither is [what results] reducible to relations between formations of the 
same order [. . .]. On the contrary, it constitutes an intermediate milieu between the 
different coexistent orders. [. . . In other words,] diffusion occurs only through the 
placing in communication of potentials of very different orders: all diffusion happens in 
the in-between, goes between, like everything that ‘grows’ of the rhizome type.202 
 
Although surplus labor (excess) is indeed captured by capital (an apparatus of capture), 
which through hylomorphic imposition homogenizes and totalizes surplus value (as capital), 
what results from the process of capture is not a homogenization or a totalization. After all, 
surplus value is not the only thing that comes out of such a process. More importantly, there is 
the assembly itself of the captured and the apparatus of capture, which, as Deleuze explains 
above, is a rhizome, a heterogeneous assemblage. Thus while excess is indeed totalized and 
homogenized (as capital) (by the State), the assemblage between the apparatus of capture and the 
captured itself remains heterogeneous. This heterogeneous assemblage, Deleuze hints, leads to 
what Deleuzians call emergence, a process that generates excess. 
To understand how this happens, we need to examine the rhizome (an abstract machine) 
more closely. In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze describes the rhizome as a specific instance of a 
multiplicity (which everything is). A multiplicity is something that, rather than conforming to a 
hylomorphic schema, does not necessarily have specific borders (and is thus very capable of 
change, of becoming) and is defined by itself (rather than by some transcendent form).203 
Perhaps the most basic characteristic of a rhizome is its heterogeneity, i.e. it connects different 
things/multiplicities together (different instances of the same ‘type’ [i.e. the type that has been 
imposed on them, like what Aristotle means by categories] and different ‘types’ of things or 
things of different ‘natures’), mingling even (especially) signs and bodies. Deleuze further says 
that “any point of a rhizome can be connected to anything other,” immediately, and without a 
hierarchy.204 A rhizome, then, is a combination of different things integrated into a whole 
without a center—an assemblage, as Deleuze alternatively calls it. 
Another principle at work in the rhizome is that of asignifying rupture. Deleuze explains 
that “every rhizome contains lines of segmentarity according to which it is stratified, 
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territorialized, organized, signified, attributed, etc., [i.e. made into some fixed thing], as well as 
lines of deterritorialization down which it constantly flees [i.e. the lines of flight where it changes 
(its habits, its qualities), becomes different].”205 It is the nature of the elements in the rhizome, in 
other words, to go off into lines of flight, to deterritorialize (change their habits, make other 
connections), although most often than not they are reterritorialized (they develop a new habit, 
join another assemblage).  
In this dynamics of deterritorialization-reterritorialization, the elements constituting a 
rhizome (Deleuze gives the example of the orchid and the wasp), upon forming a new 
assemblage (connection) in a specific territory (or with specific habits) with a particular code 
(characteristics), do not imitate each other (hence the relationship is asignifying). What is 
involved, Deleuze explains, “[is] not imitation at all but a capture of code, surplus value of code, 
an increase in valence, a veritable becoming, a becoming-wasp of the orchid and a becoming-
orchid of the wasp.”206 The elements, if in a rhizomatic connection, in effect, ‘adapt’ to each 
other, adjust to each other’s codes (or qualities, or form, the way that they are, or the way that 
they function). This adaptation, as Deleuze describes, leads to a surplus value, a value over and 
above what the elements initially have, a value that wouldn’t have emerged were it not for the 
adaptation to codes.  
Deleuze continues that “each of these becomings [then] brings about the 
deterritorialization of one term and the reterritorialization of the other, the two becomings 
interlink and form relays in a circulation of intensities pushing the deterritorialization ever 
further.”207 That is to say, after the adaptation to codes, there is a further change: a change in 
territories (or habits, or limits) in which the movements of different elements are coordinated in 
some location. As with the capture of code, this capture of flows leads to surplus value, the 
surplus value of flow.  
Together, the coding and (re)territorialization brings about a certain stratification, a 
certain rigidification of codes and territories, as different elements compose some unified whole, 
the assemblage (with relatively fixed habits and limits, and qualities or functions). At the same 
time, however, as Deleuze points out, there emerge further deterritorializations (and decodings), 
lines of flight pregnant with the potential for further surplus values. Throughout this process, as 
an assemblage (stratified to certain extents) is constituted, together the individual elements 
generate an increase (or increases) (in both codes and flows), becoming something more than if 
they were doing the same thing separately—generating excess.  
This excess generated is what Deleuzians have come to call emergence in their attempt to 
elaborate on the phenomenon hit upon by Deleuze, which explains the primitively accumulated 
stock presupposed by exploitation or capture. John Protevi, in “Deleuze, Guattari and 
Emergence” defines emergence as “the (diachronic) construction of functional structures in 
complex systems that achieve a (synchronic) focus of systematic behavior as they constrain the 
behavior of individual components.”208 According to this explanation, once elements become 
part of a system (i.e. when they become components of an assemblage), these elements 
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spontaneously achieve focused, unified behavior (without the need of a leader), which enables 
the assemblage as a whole to produce more than the same individual elements producing 
separately.209  
Protevi captures the full complexity of this phenomenon by taking time into account. He 
explains that “the time scales of each level are staggered, so that what appears as systematic 
unity on a specific level is an event, a process, from the perspective of another level with a 
longer time scale.” 210 From this description, it becomes apparent that there is a hierarchy implied 
in the concept of emergence. It is not, however, a hierarchy that subordinates individuals to the 
systems that emerge at higher levels. Rather, it is a hierarchy merely “heterochronous,” i.e. a 
hierarchy where higher-level entities are different from lower-level ones not because the former 
is superior to the latter but simply because they last longer.  
The hierarchy pertinent to the capitalist social formation is that between the assemblage 
(the unity that has emerged, the capitalist political economy) and the individual elements (its 
components, mainly the forces of labor and capital, as well as nature), with the former capable of 
outliving the latter. Here is revealed another benefit of looking at the assemblage as a whole (e.g. 
the capitalist system in its totality) rather than the individual elements in isolation (e.g. what the 
laborer produces separate from what the capitalist plans). By looking at the assemblage itself 
(which lasts longer than the individual elements), a longer time-scale is taken into account, 
revealing the dynamics of things that can only be tracked through time, realities such as surplus 
value and the stock that is presupposed. 
Consistent with Deleuze’s philosophy, the concept of emergence implies that the system 
formed by the different elements is a heterogeneous assemblage. True enough, the emergent 
assemblage (capitalism), like Deleuze’s description of the rhizome, connects different instances 
(persons, things) of different types (forces). The fact that it consists of different elements is not, 
however, all that makes an assemblage heterogeneous. An assemblage is heterogeneous in the 
further sense that, despite constituting a unity, the unity so constituted is, as Bonta and Protevi 
describe in Deleuze and Geophilosophy, a “‘consistenc[y],’ that is, [a] network of bodies that 
preserve the heterogeneity of the members even while enabling systematic emergent 
behavior.”211 While unified in an assemblage, then, the assemblage’s heterogeneous components 
(labor, capital, nature) remain different from each other, i.e. remain as heterogeneous elements 
(labor v. capital v. nature). 
This heterogeneous “territorial assemblage,” then, according to Protevi, “produces 
emergent unities transversally among organisms, subjects and technological apparatuses.”212 In 
other words, ‘emergent unities’ are constituted by and composed of not some one dominant 
element but by all the different, heterogeneous individuals in the assemblage (including things of 
different types, such as labor and nature and capital, as well as material commodities, immaterial 
commodities, discourses . . .). Since the emergence of a unity (the assemblage) is accompanied 
by the emergence of excess (what is produced by the group by virtue of coming together, being 
part of an assemblage, which is more than what they would produce if they were acting 
separately), it follow that all the elements in the assemblage—because they are part of the 
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assemblage, because they are implicated with each other transversally—are involved in the 
generation of excess, specifically the primitive accumulation of the stock. 
A Deleuzian explanation of originary excess further requires, however, that the 
assemblage leading to such emergence be an intensive unity. Reading Deleuze’s 
‘geophilosophy,’ Bonta and Protevi explain that the intensive describes processes in which 
everything is characterized by intensive properties that cannot be divided without experiencing 
qualitative change (e.g. temperature, pressure, density).213 In this state, according to them, 
assemblages form, which “are far-from-equilibrium systems operating in crisis or near a 
threshold of self-ordering, and are thus poised between the strata [i.e. actual things. . .] and the 
plane of consistency [i.e. virtual Ideas or abstract machines].”214 
Given its intensity, taking an element from an intensive body, from the assemblage 
formed in its components’ intensity (i.e. when these elements are still exhibiting intensive 
characteristics and not yet formed into the full, actual product), changes what that assemblage is. 
The assemblage’s elements, then, since it is intensive, are very much interconnected (but not as 
perplicated as the abstract machines in the virtual; though definitely not as distinguished from 
each other like actual things). This tight interconnection, however, does not prevent the 
components from un-connecting, from forming new assemblages, from, using Deleuze’s term, 
deterritorializing. Despite, or better yet, through all this, an assemblage “display[s] consistency 
or emergent effects by tapping into the ability of the self-ordering forces of heterogeneous 
material to mesh together.”215 This happens “when intensive flows [. . .] reach certain thresholds 
that activate self-ordering patterns inherent in the material interactions of the components.”216  
In other words, an assemblage has different things in it that are—by virtue of them being 
intensive—so interconnected that we can take the assemblage as a (focused and consistent) 
unity. This intensive interconnection causes the transversal connection between the elements that 
Protevi talks about, the transversal complicity that makes all the elements in the assemblage 
involved in the generation of excess, specifically the piling of the stock.  
The unity that emerges (the assemblage), it must be remembered, since it has different 
things in it, is different in itself. As established above, it is in fact in this heterogeneity 
maintained by the ‘consistency’—i.e. in the difference preserved by the assemblage—that 
adaptation, the drive for focused, emergent behavior (in both codes and flows) comes from (and 
which leads to further lines of flight). In other words, the adaptation of an element to become a 
focused or coordinated component of a cohesive whole—an adaptation rooted in the fact of 
difference (that makes an individual adjust in the first place)—is what makes possible the 
generation of values over and above what the element would be able to create were it acting by 
itself. This is the way in which difference—in necessitating adaptation and coordination in the 
combination—generates excess.  
This drive to adapt and coordinate, however, would not be possible to be fulfilled (would 
not be activated, would not be turned into a movement) were the elements being driven not 
intensive. This is because in a Deleuzian ontology, only ‘intensive flows’ or processes (as 
opposed to virtual Ideas and actual things), as explained above, are capable of reaching certain 
thresholds that enable them to move, change, and cause change in the system. The emergent 
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assemblage thus requires both heterogeneity and intensity. It is in this way that these two 
principles are presupposed by and unified in the assemblage. 
The capitalist political economy (specifically in its productive activity) is a historical 
actualization of the heterogeneous and intensive assemblage that Deleuze delineates in his 
metaphysics. Capitalism operates, after all, not solely through the activity of one master element 
(of capital operating magic, for example) but rather through the dynamics of different elements 
working together, i.e. through the assemblage of the different labors, the different capitals, the 
other factors of production (e.g. land, natural resources, etc.), along with their discursive effluxes 
and support (ideology), and their particular structuration into a social formation. Even as these 
components are intensively interconnected into a unified system (the ‘unity of composition’ that 
Deleuze speaks of) in which they are assembled and employed, they remain as individual 
elements distinct from each other (as distribution, for example, clearly shows) (in an ‘adaptive 
consistency’).217  
The capitalist social formation, moreover, as Marx shows, is built on intensive productive 
processes. After all, there is no saying in advance what each element in the economy is capable 
of doing, what sole routine each is to perform exclusively, what they are capable of creating . . . 
Labor is especially striking in this regard since it can do many different things and undergo many 
changes. A laborer, for example, can move up the production ladder, change tasks, even turn 
him/herself into something totally other by switching fields, etc. The same goes for capitalists 
who can be and are at times proletarianized. Moreover, the activities in which labor, capital, and 
natural forces are involved mesh and deconstruct each other: production-distribution-exchange-
consumption. The capitalist political economy, then, is an intensive social formation of elements, 
forces, and processes capable of great creation, interconnection, and differentiation. Thus, the 
unity that emerges from the political economy is not some totalized and homogeneous unity (i.e. 
‘capitalism’ as such) but rather, as in Deleuze’s assemblage, a consistency of intensities (i.e. 
‘capitalism’ as a social formation).  
As Deleuze describes of the rhizome, when the assemblage stratifies, codes are adapted 
to (leading to surplus value of code), flows are conjoined or territorialized (leading to surplus 
value of flow), with potentials for further lines of flight (that lead to further surplus values). This 
leads to the stock—the surplus value of code and the surplus value of flow brought about by 
adaptation/coordination—that potentially emerges along with the assemblage itself. In the 
capitalist political economy, the stratification (organization/truce) of the assemblage (social 
formation / class relation) leads to a particular configuration of human activity (production-
consumption) as mediated (by distribution-exchange) and the particular agreement between the 
collective laborer (as employed) and the collective capitalist (as owner of non-labor means of 
production and, as such, as employer).  
As this is configured, the gap between what is necessary to produce and what is 
produced, a mechanism demonstrated most dramatically (though not only) in Marx by labor, is 
constituted into something specific to the historical actualization or stratification. That is to say, 
as the assemblage is (trans)formed as the capitalist social formation, something historically 
specific happens to the gap between what is necessary to produce and what is produced. Through 
(de)codings (the acquiring of certain functions and forms: labor v. capital v. nature working 
together) and (de)territorializings (the conjoining of flows into production-distribution-exchange-
consumption) by productive forces and means, the gap lends itself to a potential stock. That is to 
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say, the split created in the means of production (labor, nature; even capital) leads to potential 
surplus values of code (due to adaptation to them)218 and surplus values of flow (due to their 
conjoining) that can primitively accumulate a stock, which is the presupposition of (capitalist) 
production and further accumulation (accumulation in general).  
In other words, the historically specific stratification of the political economy constitutes 
or (primitively) accumulates from the gap a potential stock. Without it or, more precisely, with a 
different stratification, a stock wouldn’t be constituted or, more precisely, it would be constituted 
differently, based on the particular codes and territories of that particular stratification. In direct 
production-consumption, for example, as the producer directly and immediately consumes what 
he produces, the category of what is necessary to produce and what is produced—and the gap 
between them—would not be so potent since no further production would take place until all of 
the excess is consumed or wasted (hence there would be no stock). In the capitalist political 
economy, due to the mediated nature of production-distribution-exchange-consumption and the 
antithetical but necessary relation between the collective laborer and the collective capitalist, 
whose interests, despite being cogs of the same machine, are opposed, such a gap—which 
potentially leads to a stock—is a necessary and important consequence and presupposition.  
The stock that is potentially accumulated through the historical actualization of the 
political economy at its primitive (trans)formation is the excess that potentially emerges from the 
intensive assemblage of heterogeneous individual elements. In other words, the stock is, by 
virtue of elements that remain different, that adapt to each other, that work in intensive 
consistency, the excess therefrom presupposed to be spontaneously generated. In this consists the 
‘originary’ work (as opposed to labor), as it were, that all the elements in the system perform, 
which leads to a potential stock (surplus value of code + surplus value of flow) that is primitively 
accumulated. Thus no one element (not labor, not capital, not nature) produces the stock. Rather, 
all the individual elements, by being intensively involved in the assemblage (i.e. the capitalist 
political economy), primitively accumulate excess, piling it into a potential (State) stock. Thus 
excess—more specifically, the stock—given that potentials are fulfilled (or that the virtuality is 
actualized), is spontaneously generated by individuals collectively immersed in intensive 
processes and heterogeneous assemblages.219  
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Conclusion: Spontaneous Generation and Capitalist Capture 
It must be noted that the ‘excess’ ‘spontaneously’ generated (the focus of chapter 4) is 
not the same as the surplus labor that is exploited by capital (the focus of chapter 3). The excess 
that emerges from the assemblage is what Deleuze calls the stock that is, as Marx describes it, 
primitively accumulated, which is the presupposition upon which the social formation is 
(trans)formed (in this context, as capitalist) for (further) accumulation (in general) of surplus 
value. Moreover, the stock that accumulates to the historical social assemblage, even though it is 
presupposed for the actual production of surplus value, does not necessarily and absolutely 
emerge but is a potential—is virtual—like the abstract assemblage itself. Nonetheless, the two 
(the expected presupposition and the intended consequence) are related: the virtual (potential) 
stock (the ‘undivided flow’ generated by all elements by virtue of their collective assemblage), 
by being presupposed as the State stock (the State being the central, unifying authority in what is 
an adaptive consistency, which distributes the stock first and foremost to the dominant element), 
constitutes the right to actual (captured) surplus value (the income siphoned off, i.e. exploited) 
(as capital). 
To understand this, we need to look more closely at the stock’s emergence. Deleuze 
describes the piling of the stock as taking place when “the archaic imperial State [an external, 
centralizing power . . .] steps in to overcode [individual elements, e.g.] agricultural communities, 
[in which the State] presupposes at least a certain level of development of these communities’ [or 
elements’] productive forces [. . . expecting that] there must be a potential surplus [they will 
produce] capable of constituting a State stock.”220 Due to this presupposition, the State, as 
described in chapter 2, forms or configures a unified political economy with a particular territory 
and codes (e.g. the capitalist political economy), in which, as described in chapter 3, surplus 
value is exploited by the dominant element (e.g. by capital).  
“The stock,” Deleuze describes, “depends on a new type of assemblage.”221 Explaining it 
as emerging in the threshold in which (the organization of) things change (rather than a unique 
moment that took place some time in the beginning of history), the stock is, like Marx’s 
primitive accumulation (which, as described in chapter 4, is not a unique historical moment even 
though it is historical), presupposed at the moment of the (trans)formation of the political 
economy, the (trans)formation of the social, as something that will be actualized in a new 
(re)configuration or (re)organization as one of the results.222 The stock is thus both a goal and a 
presupposition: a goal (a virtual, potential reality) presupposed to be achieved (in actuality) 
through the actualization of the assemblage. 
For Deleuze, then, “it is no longer the stock that presupposes a potential surplus [. . .]. It 
is no longer the State that presupposes advanced agricultural communities and developed forces 
of production.”223 On the contrary, the State, the external, unifying authority that is the organ of 
the dominant class (or of the dominant productive element or force), establishes the 
arrangements among individual elements—stratifies the assemblage, develops a ‘mode of 
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production’—presupposing (expecting and ‘intending’) that by doing so, through a particular 
actualization of the assemblage, a stock would be primitively accumulated or virtually piled, on 
the basis of which further surplus—surplus value—would be actually reaped and (re)distributed 
to the dominant element (in fact as the dominant element, e.g. as capital).224 In effect, then, the 
primitively accumulated stock potentially generated by all elements is the basis of surplus value 
actually produced that, through State organization or stratification, is to be captured by the 
dominant element (by capital). This is the way in which the stock, to use Deleuze’s terms, is the 
“undivided flow” from which workers derive what they convert into values, only a part of which 
is consumed by the laborers as “income [is] siphoned off” by the capitalists.225 
There are important ways, then, in which the capitalist social assemblage departs from 
Deleuze’s characterization of the rhizome.226 There is a sense in which, through State 
(trans)formation of the political economy, the individual elements and their relation to each 
other—multiplicities—are “organized, stabilized, neutralized, [. . .] resulting to impasses, 
blockages, incipient taproots, or points of structuration” that trace the rhizome into a hierarchical 
tree with a center.227 This is not inconsistent since, as Deleuze explains, there is not a dualism 
between the immanent rhizomatic assemblage and the upright, deeply rooted transcendent 
structure of the tree. There is, rather, an interpenetration in which “there are knots of 
arborescence in rhizomes, and rhizomatic offshoots in roots, [. . .] despotic formations of 
immanence and channelization specific to rhizomes [. . . and] anarchic deformations in the 
transcendent system of trees, aerial roots, and subterranean stems.”228 Like the different elements 
of the assemblage itself, the rhizome and the tree are structural formations in which “one [is] 
inside the other and both [are] plugged into an immense outside that is a multiplicity in any 
case.”229 
Perhaps the greatest manifestation of the tree in the capitalist rhizome is the fact that the 
work being done in the political economy, including the adaptation to and coordination of 
difference presupposed at its (trans)formation (to say nothing of its maintenance and expansion), 
is, through the authority of the State, directed by and towards a dominant element, skewing what 
is supposed to be a rhizomatic process. While in fact the collective capitalist, like the collective 
laborer, also works (in conjunction with nature), not all elements in the system have equal power, 
economy, or requirements. The social formation is structured in a certain way, i.e. as a capitalist 
social formation. Since all elements have to (economically) align themselves to the (political) 
stratification of the social formation, difference is guided by the (imperial) rule that all elements 
be subordinated to the political economy’s dominant force—capital—to which productive 
activity, as Marx shows, is first and foremost directed, thereby feeding, bolstering, and 
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strengthening its power and economy, consolidating further its dominance and rule, its social 
formation.  
For this reason (the fact that the tree is in the rhizome), Deleuze observes that “the stock 
seems [. . .] to have a necessary correlate: either the coexistence of simultaneously exploited 
territories, or a succession of exploitations on one and the same territory.”230 In other words, 
actual exploitation—capitalist capture—is implied by and built into the ‘primitive’ process of 
virtual stockpiling, in the (trans)formation of the system. The actualization of the assemblage as 
the capitalist political economy presupposes the primitive accumulation of the stock (through the 
State) to capital, which, among other things, legitimates its exploitation or capture of (further) 
surplus values from (further) accumulations. Virtual stockpiling or primitive accumulation is 
presupposed—and the political economy is actualized or structured according to it—for the 
capture and accumulation in general of surplus value as capital, thereby actualizing it. The 
generated stock (that belongs to the dominant element) is thus presupposed in order, in the form 
of surplus value, to be actually produced and, thereby, captured (as capital).  
This is the “violence” that Deleuze describes “always presents itself as preaccomplished,” 
“a violence that necessarily operates through the State [. . . to] constitute[. . .] primitive 
accumulation, and make[] possible the capitalist mode of production itself.”231 This is the sense 
in which capital, the dominant element, “captur[es actual surplus value] while simultaneously 
constituting a right to capture [via the virtual stock presupposed].”232 Thus values (including 
surplus values), due to the presupposition of the primitive accumulation of the stock, are securely 
directed by and towards the dominant element in the assemblage (at least in the first instance, 
after which the dominant element further distributes).233  
In arguing that the (virtual) stock is presupposed for the (capitalist) capture of (actual) 
surplus value, Deleuze describes the same mechanisms that underlie what Marx calls 
exploitation: alienation, abstraction, valorization, and monopolistic appropriation. Moreover, by 
probing it in its virtuality, Deleuze is able to explain how such a process can take place. At the 
same time, however, Deleuze opens up the possibility for questioning the role that different 
elements play in that process, challenging Marx’s model.234 If virtually (i.e. at its abstract level, 
which is its metaphysical basis) excess in the capitalist political economy is generated 
collectively by all individual elements, then it would seem that, unlike in Marx, labor can no 
longer claim to be the sole producer of value, including surplus value. If the virtual basis of 
surplus value, the stock, is indeed generated collectively, then all elements in the system would 
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233 The fact that values are first and foremost—i.e. monopolistically—appropriated by the dominant element, capital, 
unravels the neoclassical argument that all elements in the system receive their fair shares. In Harvey’s explication, 
the concept of fair shares assumes that “competition for productive forces—land, labour and capital—forces 
entrepreneurs to pay an amount equal to the value that the marginal (last employed) unit of each factor creates. 
Given a particular technological state and relative factor supplies (scarcities), then competition ensures that each 
factor ‘gets what it creates,’ that ‘exploitation of a factor cannot occur.’” From this, Harvey notes, “it is [. . .] a short 
step to infer that the distributive shares of rent, wages, interest, etc., are socially just fair shares. The political 
implication is that there is no point in, or call for, class struggle, and that government intervention should be 
confined largely to ensuring that perfect competition prevails.” Harvey, 41. If values first and foremost belong to 
capital, the dominant element, then competition and distribution (that allows an element to compete) are unfair to 
begin with. 
234 In this sense, capture is more general than exploitation, and not only in the sense that it’s virtual. 
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have a claim on it (even though the claims may be unequal). This includes capital, whose claim 
would be based not only on the fact that surplus value is presupposed as a State stock (the rights 
to which belong to it as the dominant element), but as a participant generator—i.e. as direct 
producer—if only virtually.  
This is compounded by the fact that the values produced by each element —especially 
those over and above what is necessary for each to produce, i.e. the surplus values—is extremely 
difficult to measure in what is a collective and social (not to mention intensive) production-
distribution-exchange-consumption. If the exact contribution of each element to the assemblage 
is not determined, how are values to be distributed? If production cannot be its basis, what could 
determine distribution (which itself determines further production)? How is surplus value in 
particular to be distributed, considering that it leads to the accumulation of further means of 
production, which, in turn, means not only economic but political power? Capital, the dominant 
element, as Deleuze and Marx establish, indeed captures, but to what extent does it keep values 
to itself? And how much value, by struggling with capital, are other elements (especially labor) 
able to get? If values cannot be distributed based on which element produced what, is there 
another way, another (trans)formation of the social perhaps, that is less dominated than 
benevolent? Or, better yet, what would a truly rhizomatic political economy look like? 
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